

Federal Government of Somalia

**The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling,
Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel
Mines and on Their Destruction**

Request:

**For an extension of the deadline for completing the
destruction of anti-personnel mines in mined areas in
accordance with Article 5**

April 2021

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Abbreviations and acronyms

Acronym/abbreviation	Meaning
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
AP	Anti-personnel [mine]
APMBC	Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention
AT/AV	Anti-Tank/Anti-Vehicle [mine]
BAC	Battle Area Clearance
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
CHA	Confirmed Hazardous Area
CMC	Cluster Munition Convention
CMD	Conventional munition disposal
CMR	Cluster munition remnant
DEC	Development evaluation criteria
DDG	Danish Demining Group
EO	Explosive ordnance
EOD	Explosive ordnance disposal
EORE	Explosive ordnance risk education (formerly MRE)
ERW	Explosive remnants of war
ETC	Estimated time of completion
FGD	Focus group discussion
FGS	Federal Government of Somalia
FMS	Federal member states
GDP	Gross domestic product
GICHD	Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
HALO	(formerly the HALO Trust)
HMA	Humanitarian Mine Action
ICBL	International Campaign to Ban Landmines
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally displaced person(s)
IED	Improvised explosive device
IHL	International humanitarian law
IMAS	International Mine Action Standards
IMSMA	Information Management System for Mine Action
KABP	Knowledge, attitude, belief and practices [survey]
KII	Key informant interview
LIS	Landmine impact survey
LSA	Land service ammunition
MAC	Mine action centre
MAG	(formerly the Mines Advisory Group)

(a)	(b)
MAR	Mine Action Review
MCA	Multi-criteria analysis
MDD	Mine detecting dogs
MMC	Manual mine clearance
MOIS	Ministry of Internal Security
MRE	Mine Risk Education (see EORE)
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
NMAA	National Mine Action Authority
NMAS	National Mine Action Standards
NOTAM	Notice to airmen
NTS	Non-technical survey
NPA	Norwegian People's Aid
OAP	Oslo Action Plan (2019)
PMAC	Puntland Mine Action Centre
QA	Quality assurance
QC	Quality control
QM	Quality management
SEMA	Somali Explosives Management Authority
SGBV	Sexual and gender based violence
SHA	Suspect hazardous area/suspected hazard area
SMAP	Somali Mine Action Programme
SNA	Somali National Army
SNMAA	Somali National Mine Action Authority
SOP	Standard operation procedure(s)
TNMA	Technical note on mine action [supporting IMAS]
TS	Technical survey
UN	United Nations
UNDP	UN Development Programme
UNMAS	UN Mine Action Service
UNOPS	UN Office for Project Services
UNSF	UN Strategic Framework
UNSOMA	UN Somalia Mine Action [Programme]
UNSOM	United Nations Assistance Mission In Somalia
UNSOS	United Nations Support Office In Somalia
UOS	Ukrobnoservis
UXO	Unexploded ordnance
VOIED	Victim-operated IED
WAM	Weapons and ammunition management

I. Executive Summary

Introduction

Somalia acceded to the Convention on 16 April 2012, and the Convention entered into force for Somalia on 1 October 2012. While Somalia's efforts to respond to the complex contamination present in the country extends to the period before entry into force of the Convention. Since entry into force, Somalia has remained committed to implementing its obligations under the Convention. While significant progress has been achieved, due to several challenges, Somalia has been unable to achieve all its obligations as given under Article 5 by its original Article 5 deadline of 1 October 2022. This extension request highlights the achievements made during Somalia's original ten-year deadline, as well as those circumstances that have impeded progress. In this way, this document proposes an extension of Somalia's deadline for five years, it includes a forward looking plan for the period of the requested extension, 1 October 2022- 1 October 2027.

Origin of the Article 5 challenge

The recent history of armed conflict in Somalia dates back to the Ethiopian-Somali wars of 1964, and 1977–1978. Since this period, Somalia has witnessed repeated conflict in five Federal State Administrations and Somaliland¹. Armed conflict during this period is characterised by the following,

- 1988-1991 between Armed rebel's vs Military Government
- 1992- 2005, Civil War,
- 2006-2007, Islamic Courts vs Ethiopia Forces
- Conflict with extremist groups (SNA, supported by AMISOM).

¹ One artefact of the Somali conflict of 1991 is the state of Somaliland. The State of Somaliland remains part of Somalia *de jure* and is therefore under the jurisdiction of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS). However due to the current situation, the State of Somaliland is not – at the moment - fully under the *de facto* control of the FGS for the purposes of planning, coordinating and conducting the clearance of anti-personnel mines. Until this temporary situation is resolved, Somalia interprets its current obligations under the Convention to encompass APM contamination in the remaining states of Somalia. The FGS will keep this situation under review and will report any change in its Article 7 reports.

As a result of these periods of conflict, Somalia is contaminated with mines and other explosive remnants of war (ERW). Contamination with anti-personnel landmines and other explosive ordnance are known to exist in Somalia's border regions with Ethiopia, within Somalia around towns, military installations and within distance of civilian infrastructure. Contamination remains largely unknown and complex, including recontamination of previously cleared areas, accessible stockpiles of weapons and ammunition, as well as the use of improvised explosive devices (IED) by non-state armed groups. In this context, the response of Somalia to its obligations under Article 5 forms part of its overall response to explosive ordnance in the country.

Nature and extent of progress made since entry into force

Somalia has undertaken several efforts to respond to the complex contamination present in the country, including actions taken before entry into force of the Convention, (1 October 2012). The establishment of State based Mine Action Centers with the support of UNDP was carried out during the period 1999-2007, and since 2008 with the support of UNMAS. On the 4th December 2011, Somalia established the Somalia National Mine Action Authority (SNMAA). In August 2013, the Somalia Explosive Management Authority (SEMA) was established by Presidential decree under the Ministry of Internal Security, replacing the SNMAA². SEMA was afforded an office at Federal level, and five (5) State based offices in, (Puntland, Jubaland, South West State, Galmudug, and Hirshabelle).

Early efforts to quantify anti-personnel landmine contamination in the country include two landmine impact surveys (LIS) conducted in phases in the States of Somaliland and Puntland (2003-2008). Resulting in over 1,300 hazard areas, (including all types of explosive ordnance) being identified. At this time, the South-Central part of the country was not included in the above affected and indicated area. In 2008, localised surveys began to estimate the level of contamination in Bakool and Bay; South West State, and Hiraan; Hirshabelle State. These surveys resulted in one in ten communities surveyed reporting to be contaminated by mines and/or ERW. Other contaminated areas were reported along the border with Ethiopia, in Galguduud and Gedo regions.

During 2012, a re-survey of hazard areas identified during the two-phase LIS was undertaken by HALO and DDG. The re-survey focused on technical survey and reduced the known level of contamination for all hazard types. Somalia in its initial Article 7 report (2013)

² Decree 107, dated 6 Aug 2013

reported 333 mined areas known to contain anti-personnel mines as remaining from previous LIS surveys. However, further efforts to identify the number of square metres has proven difficult.

During the period 2015-2017, a non-technical survey was undertaken by the HALO Trust in 3 regions, (Bakool;South West State, Galgaduud; Galmudug State, and Hiraan; Hirshabelle State). As a result, a total of 75 mined areas and one battlefield area were identified together measuring 6,052,744 square metres. Overall, for the period 2015-2020, Somalia reported having addressed 9 mined areas measuring 1,665,450 square metres, including 8 Confirmed Hazardous areas measuring 1,630,450 square metres and 1 SHA measuring 35,000 square metres.

Circumstances impeding compliance within period of extension request

While the current COVID-19 pandemic has impacted the efforts of all operators, the capacity of the Somalia Government and implementing partners to adapt and adopt changes to external shocks, reveals the overall cooperation present in the programme. Despite, this cooperation the following factors were identified as significant circumstances that impeded Somalia's progress in achieving its mine action obligations within its initial 10-year period.

1. Insufficient information about the extent of the contamination
2. Insufficient information about the impact of the contamination
3. Limited access to contaminated areas by our teams because of security concerns
4. Limited access to contaminated areas because of security concerns
5. Other types of contamination (such as IED) have had to take priority
6. Lack of training
7. Lack of resources
8. Lack of effective coordination and prioritization(*Mine Action Implementing Partners on the ground are not consulting with Authority on the prioritization of contaminated land*)

Humanitarian, economic, social and environmental implications

Armed conflict in Somalia has impacted all major economic activities. Subsequently, the impact of explosive ordnance (EO) has restricted access to land and other resources. These restrictions have particularly egregious effects on the rural poor who may have little choice in using contaminated land, in the face of other shocks or stresses. The presence of explosive hazards directly impacts the safety of affected communities, including returnees and internally displaced people.

Remaining Challenge

At the end of 2019, the SEMA reported 125 suspected and confirmed mined areas covering an estimated total area of 16,200,000 square metres. However, an accurate survey of all known or suspected mined areas has proven difficult to undertake for reasons provided in this document.

Requested time for extension

Somalia is requesting a five-year extension of its deadline under Article of the Convention, 1 October 2022 – 1 October 2027.

Rationale for the time requested

The rationale for the period requested in this document is based on the current human, financial and technical resources available to implement Somalia's obligations under Article 5, as well as the current level of insecurity present in the country.

Somalia remains committed to fulfilling its obligations under the Convention, particularly in respect to Article 5. Somalia is committed to work towards the goals of the Oslo Action Plan, (2020-2024), including to complete the obligations as soon as possible and to the fullest extent possible by 2025. However, due to the circumstances cited above, Somalia will need to request a period extending beyond the aspirational date of 2025 and will continue to keep the States Parties updated on its progress, in achieving its obligations and goals.

Work plan

SEMA will continue to work with stakeholders to continue lifesaving mine action activities in accessible areas while continuing national capacity building efforts to build greater coordination. However, the current security situation contains coordination and implementation of mine action to specific locations at this time.

The detailed work plan for the period of the requested extension given below is based on two key components.

- i) Building the national capacity of SEMA, and,
- ii) Continued implementation of mine action activities in secure areas.

Somalia will use a two-phase approach to implement activities under each of the respective components.

Phase 1. Present - 1 October 2022.

Phase 2. 1 October 2022 – 1 October 2027.

The 2019 Oslo Action Plan (OAP) includes significant detail on how to operationalise clearance and mine risk education activities together with indicators for measuring progress. In formulating the work plan Somalia has considered key elements of the OAP.

Phase One

This phase covers the period from the present time to 1 October 2022. This phase includes the engagement of key stakeholders in the identification and implementation of capacity building activities in support of national demining institutions, continuation of land release and EORE activities, and planning of non-technical survey.

1. Build the capacity of national demining institutions SEMA (OAP Action #1 and #44).
2. Continuation of Land Release Activities.
3. Non-technical survey in accessible areas (OAP Actions #2, #8, #18, #19).
4. Mine Risk Education (OAP Actions #28-32).

Phase Two

The second phase of this action plan covers the period 1 October 2022 – 1 October 2027. During this period Somalia will continue with the activities described in Phase 1. However, phase 2 will bring greater focus to the planning and implementation of non-technical survey (NTS) in currently accessible areas in order to identify to the extent possible, the precise perimeter of mined areas.

Financial Resources (national and international)

At the moment, SEMA is reliant on foreign financial resources. This is largely due to the current economic situation in Somalia. However, a budget proposal for SEMA has been submitted to the Ministry of Internal Security (MOIS). It is hoped that formal approval of SEMA together with allocations from the State budget will improve to facilitate future contributions of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), as well as leverage international support to SEMA. In the meantime, SEMA is currently working with stakeholders on a national capacity building plan, together with a more detailed and costed operational work plan, including desktop survey and non-technical survey. During 2021, a detailed budget will be produced for activities under the work plan together with a resource mobilisation strategy

The estimated annual cost for implementing the current work plan is estimated to be US \$6,400,000 per year. This includes:

1. SEMA operations at Federal and State levels (5 Offices): US \$900,000 per year
2. UN agency support to Article Five compliance: US \$500,000 per year
3. Implementation of projected land release US \$5,000,000 per year.

Assumptions / Risks of the plan

The following assumptions and risks are made regarding the realisation of the plan.

1. Security. Somalia is beset by a number of security challenges. This work plan assumes there will be improvement in the current security situation in order to carry out non-technical survey in as many accessible areas as necessary. Somalia will continue to keep the States Parties apprised of its progress in implementing its work plan under Article 5 on an annual basis through its Article 7 reports and at Meetings of the States Parties.

2. Productivity. Somalia will support innovation in mine action that can improve efficiency and effectiveness of land release methodologies in accordance with OAP Action #27.

3. Funding. Current capacity building and land release is funded by external donors through SEMA's implementing partners at present. Significant reduction in funding will have an overall impact on coordination and productivity.

II. Detailed Narrative

1. Origins of the Article 5 implementation challenge

The recent history of armed conflict in Somalia dates back to the Ethiopian-Somali wars of 1964, and 1977–1978. Since this period, Somalia has witnessed repeated conflict in five states of the country and Somaliland³. Conflict during this period is characterised by the following,

- 1988-1991 between Armed rebel's vs Military Government
- 1992- 2005, Civil War,
- 2006-2007, Islamic Courts vs Ethiopia Forces
- Conflict with extremist groups (SNA, supported by AMISOM).

As a result of these periods of conflict, Somalia is contaminated with mines and other explosive remnants of war (ERW). Contamination with anti-personnel landmines and other explosive ordnance are known to exist in Somalia's border regions with Ethiopia, within Somalia around towns, military installations and within distance of civilian infrastructure. Contamination remains largely unknown and complex, including recontamination of previously cleared areas, accessible stockpiles of weapons and ammunition, as well as the use of improvised explosive devices (IED) by non-state armed groups. In this context, the response of Somalia to its obligations under Article 5 forms part of its overall response to explosive ordnance in the country.

³ One artefact of the Somali conflict of 1991 is the state of Somaliland. The State of Somaliland remains part of Somalia *de jure* and is therefore under the jurisdiction of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS). However due to the current situation, the State of Somaliland is not – at the moment – fully under the *de facto* control of the FGS for the purposes of planning, coordinating and conducting the clearance of anti-personnel mines. Until this temporary situation is resolved, Somalia interprets its current obligations under the Convention to encompass APM contamination in the remaining states of Somalia. The FGS will keep this situation under review and will report any change in its Article 7 reports.




Figure 1. Estimated contamination in South-Central Somalia, (1977-1993)

2. Nature and extent of the original Article 5 challenge: quantitative aspects

The location of anti-personnel contamination as a result of these conflicts can be said to be situated along border areas between Somalia and Ethiopia, including the States of Galmudug, Puntland, Jubaland, South West State and Somaliland. While several survey have been undertaken to quantify the nature and extent of this contamination, they were constrained by security challenges, including localised conflict, and considerable time given to negotiation with local actors, and the need for greater coordination.



Photo 1. P4MK1 AP mine found in Waberi, Dhusamareb, Galgaduud Region, 2020 (photo: The HALO Trust)

As a result, survey efforts were constrained to specific geographical areas with the scope of nature and extent of the original Article 5 challenge difficult to quantify. Currently, some areas of Somalia remain in active conflict, presenting a complex nature of historical contamination, including reports of recontamination or cleared areas, that continues to impact local populations, hinder the use of roads and prevent infrastructure development.




Figure 2. Somalia Explosive Hazard Contamination (All types of EO), (2004-2012).

3. Nature and extent of the original Article 5 challenge: National demining structures

While Somalia has undertaken several efforts to respond to the complex contamination present in the country before entry into force of the Convention (1 October 2012). The establishment of State based Mine Action Centres with the support of UNDP during the period, 1999-2007, and since 2008 with the support of UNMAS. On the 4th December 2011 Somalia established the Somalia National Mine Action Authority (SNMAA). In August 2013, the Somalia Explosive Management Authority (SEMA) was established by Presidential

decree under the Ministry of Internal Security replacing the SNMAA⁴. SEMA was afforded an office at Federal level, and five (5) State based offices in, (Puntland, Jubaland, South West State, Galmudug, and Hirshabelle).

The role of SEMA is to assume full responsibility for the coordination of all five pillars of mine action, (mine clearance, advocacy, mine risk education, stockpile destruction and victim assistance), and WAM. The Federal SEMA is also responsible to oversee humanitarian mine action activities by conducting quality control, coordination, and prioritization. At the strategic level, SEMA has focused on strategic matters, including representing Somalia in international treaty related meetings and conferences, reporting against treaty obligations and leading resource mobilization activities.



Photo 2. Mr. Dahir Director of the Somalia Explosive Management Authority presenting an update in progress of Somalia's commitments under Article 5 to the Fourth Review Conference, Oslo, Norway, 2019

In support of this transition, legislation together with a supporting budget for SEMA was drafted and sent to Federal Parliament for approval. As part of the transition process, in early 2015, UNMAS handed over coordination of the information management system, as well as national technical mine action standards and guidelines (NTSG). In 2017, SEMA developed a National Strategy for Mine Action (2018-2020) that outlined five goals:

Goal 1: To enhance the capacity and capability of SEMA to lead, direct and enable effective and efficient mine action and explosives management in Somalia.

⁴ Decree 107, dated 6 Aug 2013

Goal 2: To develop the Somali mine action consortia into a wholly national capacity delivering appropriate HMA support to all member states, safely, efficiently and in accordance with national and international standards, expectations and requirements.

Goal 3: to engage with stakeholders in order to understand, and better respond to, their needs, preferences and expectations in relation to the impact of mines and ERW contamination in Somalia.

Goal 4: To reduce the risks faced by the people of Somalia to allow them to go about their lives free from the impacts of mines and ERW.

Goal 5: To comply, so far as is reasonably practicable, with the requirements of those treaties to which Somalia is a signatory and which are relevant to the mine and explosives management programme.

However, progress for SEMA has been constrained by numerous factors. Draft legislation and budget approval has been delayed resulting in differences of perception regarding SEMA's legitimacy and intermittent budget allocations. This has resulted in staff turnover, reducing internal resources and knowledge. In response, capacity building efforts have been enacted by international actors. Currently, the SEMA Federal office has a staff of 15 people, with two persons in the SEMA state offices operating in each of the 5 states.

Several international UN agencies and humanitarian organisations have been present in the country.

- UNMAS:

The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) has been in country since 2008, providing capacity building support at both Federal and State levels. In 2017, UNMAS handed over its information management system for mine action IMSMA. Since then, UNMAS has been conducting and tendering mine clearance activities related humanitarian mine clearance including Survey, EORE, EOD and recently manual clearance of minefields mainly along the border areas with Ethiopia; as well as security related support contracts such IED Threat Mitigation in support of mission troops and Somali Police Forces to build their capability to respond IEDs and other EO.

- HALO: Has been in Somalia since 2015 where it conducted significant survey along border areas with Ethiopia, (2015-2017) and since expanded to clearance of these areas.
- MAG: Present in Somalia since 2009, originally working in Puntland and undertaking work in support of Ammunition management and EORE.
- Danish Demining Group (DDG): DDG present in Somalia 2007 undertaking EORE activities in Benadir Region, South West and Jubaland states.
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA): Present in Somalia since 2015, providing capacity building support to SEMA, EORE and BAC.
- Ukrobnoservis (UOS): present in Somalia since 2010 undertaking clearance in 4 States, together with extension EORE.

National Consortia: There are five national consortiums operating in the FMS of Somalia, representing each federal member state. The consortiums have a capability to deliver risk education services to their respective areas of operations. SEMA is planning to merge the five consortia into one entity for near future.

4. Methods used to identify areas containing AP mines and reasons for suspecting the presence of AP mines in other areas

The handover of coordination from UNMAS to SEMA in 2015 included the conferral of technical mine action standards and guidelines developed during UNMAS tenure. These standards, based on the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) direct the implementation of mine clearance, oversee the accreditation of mine action organisations and outline quality assurance for tasks completed.



Photo 3. People from a local community play sport on recently released land.

The Somalia National Mine Action standards direct the methods used to process known or suspected mined areas. Areas that are identified to contain or to suspect to contain anti-personnel landmines are processed according to the land release process, as contained in the Somalia national standards. Land Release in Somalia, involves, non-technical survey, technical survey and clearance through manual and/or other methodologies, including the use of mine detection dogs.

5. Nature and extent of progress made quantitative aspects

Somalia's effort to respond to anti-personnel mine contamination began before it joined the Convention in 2012. These early efforts include two Landmine impact surveys (LIS) conducted in two States Puntland and Somaliland. The South-Central part of the country was not included in the above affected and indicated area.




Figure 3. Locations of Three Phased Landmine Impact Surveys, 2003-2008

LIS Phase I - Somaliland

- Implemented in Somaliland in 2002-2003 in the following regions: Awdal, Hargeisa, Togdheer and Saaxil.
- A total of 772 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) were identified in 356 communities, 45 communities were reported to be highly impacted, 102 medium impacted, and 210 were low impacted.




Figure 4. Location of Explosive Hazards, LIS Phase 1

LIS Phase II - Puntland

- Implemented in 2005 in Puntland in the regions: Bari, Nugaal and North of Mudug.
- A total of 47 SHAs were identified in 35 communities, 9 communities were reported to be highly impacted, 9 medium impacted and 17 were low impacted .

LIS Disputed Areas (Sool and Sanaag Regions)

- The two regions Sool and Sanaag were surveyed in 2006-2007.
- A total of 210 SHAs were identified in 90 communities, 11 communities were reported highly impacted, 24 medium impacted and 55 low impacted.




Figure 5. LIS Phase 2 and 3 locations Sool and Sanaag Regions

As a result of the two phase LIS, **an estimated 1,039 SHA were identified, covering all types of explosive ordnance, in 481 communities, covering 8 regions.** However, broader efforts to disaggregate the SHA and conduct further technical survey to identify the exact perimeters of the hazard areas have been constrained by insecurity and recurrent conflicts.

In 2008, localised surveys began to estimate the level of contamination in the South West regions, including Bakol, Bay, and Hirshabelle region of Hiran. These surveys resulted in one in ten of the 718 communities surveyed reporting to be contaminated by mines and/or ERW. Other contaminated areas were reported along the border with Ethiopia, in Galguduud and Gedo regions, as well as in Hiraan.

During 2012, a re-survey of hazard areas identified during the two-phase LIS was undertaken by HALO and DDG. The re-survey focused on technical survey and reduced the known level of contamination for all hazards types.




Figure 6. Re-survey of State based LIS Data –conducted in 2012

As a result, Somalia in its Article 7 report of 2013, reported 333 mined areas known to contain anti-personnel mines as remaining from its previous LIS surveys . However, further efforts to identify the number of square metres has proven difficult.




Figure 7. Map showing explosive hazard contamination (all types) in Somalia for the period 2004-2012

During the period 2015-2017, a non-technical survey was undertaken by the HALO Trust in 3 regions, (Bakool; South West State, Galgaduud; Galmudug State, and Hiraaan; Hirshabelle State). As a result, a total of 75 mined areas and one battlefield area were identified together measuring 6,052,744 square metres, as given in the table and map below.

NTS Survey Area by District			
Province	District	Task Type	Survey Area (m ²)
Bakool	El Barde	Minefield	885,363
		BAC	762,143
	Yeed	Minefield	786,379
Galgaduud	Abudwaq	Minefield	1,013,228
Hiraan	Beletweyne	Minefield	2,605,631
Total			6,052,744

Table 1. Total Reported outputs for Non-technical survey, 2015-2017




Figure 8. Results of Non-Technical Survey conducted 2015-2016



Photo 4. Mine Action Representative conducting an interview during non-technical survey, (2015-2017)

In its Article 7 report of 2018, Somalia reported that the process of updating and verifying historical data was continuing. Somalia also reported it had implemented a new country reporting structure including 7 States: Banadir, Hirshabelle, Souh West, Jubaland, Galmudug, Puntland and Somaliland. Based on this update Somalia provided progress covering three states, Galmudug, Hirshabelle and South West with information from Banadir, Jubaland and Puntland reported to be in still undergoing processing.

As a result, Somalia reported 107 Confirmed Hazardous Areas and 5 Suspected Hazardous Areas located in Galmudug and Hirshabelle State as registered in SEMA's database, with 18 of these areas containing anti-personnel mines. Somalia reported a remaining challenge of 18,577,705 square metres, including 7,066,584 square metres in Galmudug State, including 3,482,650 square metres of confirmed hazardous area contaminated by anti-personnel landmines. A total of 7,170,123 square metres in Hirshabelle State, including 381,922 square metres of confirmed hazardous area contaminated by anti-personnel landmines, and a total of 4,340,998 square metres in South west State, including 2,234,264 square metres of confirmed hazardous areas contaminated with anti-personnel landmines.




Figure 9. Reported locations of mine clearance completed as part of 2015-2017 Survey efforts.



Photo 5. PP-Mi-Sr AP mine (Photo: The Halo Trust)




Figure 10. Closed Hazard Areas for the period (2015-2020).

According to SEMA, new estimates of contamination have resulted because of “closed” hazardous areas being removed from the database, with the true extent of contamination is expected to be far greater. SEMA intends to synchronise the national database with that of operators in order to improve the quality of the database and, as of August 2020, had begun to meet with operators to begin this process.

Further land release efforts were undertaken in 2019, with Somalia reporting a total area including all types of explosive ordnance measuring 15,661,737 square metres released. This included 207,500 square metres cancelled, 49,925 square metres reduced, and 15,404,312 square metres cleared. As a result, Somalia reported a total of 30 hazards, including 18 confirmed hazardous areas measuring 6,098,836 square metres and 11 suspected hazardous areas (SHA) including 1 measuring an estimated 10.4 square metres, and 10 of an unknown size remaining to be addressed.



Photo 6. UNMAS Contracted Mine Action Team

At this time, due to a lack of resources to deploy sufficient survey teams and lack of access to areas due to ongoing security concerns, a more detailed estimate of mine contamination is not able to be made in Somalia.

6. Nature and extent of progress made qualitative aspects

Since acceding to the Convention in 2012, Mine Action in Somalia has faced two recurrent challenges that continue to impede progress, a) lack of resources and, b) continued

insecurity. In terms of a lack of resources, this has been exacerbated by the wait for budget approval of SEMA by the Government, reducing the allocation of funding from the State budget. This has resulted in SEMA being dependent on external support to undertake coordination of the Somalia mine action programme.

During this time, international actors, including UNMAS and NPA have provided elements of capacity building support to SEMA. This has proved essential to national coordination whilst SEMA awaits sustainable national budgetary support. Capacity building support has been directed to both Federal and State level SEMA offices, covering administrative, management and technical operations, (task order preparation, Quality Assurance, and database management). Through these targeted approaches capacity development has aimed to coordinate mine action more effectively in the country. Further capacity building efforts have focused on supporting consortia of local humanitarian mine organisations. The development of local capacities has focused on explosive hazard response, risk education and survey.

Insecurity continues as a result of inter-clan conflict and the presence of non-state armed groups. Conflict between clans can place survey and clearance personnel direct risk of harm, restricts the mobility of goods and teams across different regions, constraining operational efficiency and increasing the logistical challenge in training and deploying teams.

7. Methods & standards used to release areas known or suspected to contain AP mines

The Somalia NMAS are based on the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). Where necessary these standards have been enhanced to provide the most appropriate level of safety required for humanitarian mine action operations in Somalia. The first edition of the Somalia standards were published on 1 August 2018. These standards are due to be reviewed over the course of 2021 that will include a review of the standards applying to the planned comprehensive NTS.

Current methods and standards used to release mined areas are based on Somalia's national mine action standards (NMAS) previously developed by UNMAS and SEMA. The NMAS based on the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). These standards provide the most appropriate level of safety required for humanitarian mine action operations in Somalia. SEMA together with stakeholders in the Somalia Mine Action Programme have reviewed these standards and developed an updated series of national mine action

standards. Edition 1, Version 1 of these standards were published on 1 Aug 2018. These standards outline the key phases of the land release process to be used by implementing partners in the response to mined areas. The NMAS are split into four parts:

1. Part 1. Land Release
2. Part 2. Information System Management (IMSMA)
3. Part 3. Mine Risk Education (MRE)
4. Part 4. Quality Assurance of Mine Action Operations (QA)

These standards direct the work of all operators implementing humanitarian mine action in the country.

8. Efforts undertaken to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians from mined areas

The primary means to exclude civilians from mined areas is through explosive ordnance risk education (EORE). An EORE programme has long been established in Somalia. A number of studies have been done on the conduct of EORE in Somalia, taking into account both the cultural and security issues and the prevalence of improvised explosive devices (IED) in Somalia.

The national mine action strategy quotes the highlights that, *“The presence of large quantities of abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) at abandoned ammunition storage facilities...provides raw materials for the manufacture of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by Al-Shabaab. It is estimated that 91% of IEDs in Somalia are composed of explosives harvested from ERW.”*⁵

⁵ Somalia National Mine Action Plan, page 12.



Photo 7. EORE taking place with internally displaced people.

Table: MRE (EORE) Beneficiaries disaggregated by sex and year

Year	Boys	Girls	Men	Women	Total
2011	55,503	49,854	22,108	47,804	175,269
2012	88,593	80,400	21,775	38,598	229,366
2013	211,233	185,540	53,456	75,598	525,827
2014	71,752	56,270	34,733	32,487	195,242
2015	37,961	30,298	22,081	22,309	112,649
2016	7,301	5,926	3,910	4,644	21,781
2017	4,245	2,532	2,400	2,110	11,287
2018	12,359	8,597	5,527	4,181	30,664
2019	17,601	12,006	7,274	6,108	42,989
2020	21,493	15,768	11,635	13,422	62,318
2021 (Jan-March)	7,237	5,659	2,742	2,985	18,623
Total	535,278	452,850	187,641	250,246	1,426,015

Table 2. MRE (EORE) beneficiaries disaggregated by sex and year

Table: MRE (EORE) beneficiaries disaggregated by sex and region

Region	Boys	Girls	Men	Women	Total
Bakool	15,483	11,456	12,166	11,369	50,474
Banadir	267,260	233,497	67,303	107,779	675,839
Bay	54,411	38,463	15,947	36,634	145,455
Galgaduud	25,770	19,892	17,822	17,774	81,258
Gedo	63,767	55,296	13,162	12,960	145,185
Hiraan	37,219	32,876	14,551	13,403	98,049
Lower Jubba	27,515	27,309	22,482	30,271	107,577
Lower Shabelle	29,258	23,678	16,848	14,264	84,048
Middle Jubba	2	12	-	33	47
Middle Shabelle	6,995	4,116	4,989	2,122	18,222
Mudug	6,843	5,672	2,016	3,388	17,919
PL-Bari	144	95	168	126	533
PL-Mudug	579	478	51	105	1,213
PL-Nugaal	32	10	136	18	196
Grand Total	535,278	452,850	187,641	250,246	1,426,015

Table 3. MRE (EORE) beneficiaries disaggregated by sex and region.

In 2018 a new study, entitled “Knowledge, Attitude, Practice and Behaviour (KAPB) Baseline Survey on Explosive Remnants of War and landmines Galmudug and Puntland States of Somalia” . The study employed a mix of qualitative and quantitative methods, and a suitable sample size. The KAPB study reports that 84% of those interviewed have heard about

ERWs/landmines (i.e. are 'aware') but that 15% of those interviewed have "never heard of ERWs/landmines".

As part of recent developments, the MRE stakeholders have produced the Risk Education Talking Device' (RETD). This device is a solar powered handheld audio device commissioned by UNMAS and 2,500 units have been handed out to the beneficiary households by HALO, UOS and JUMAN. The RETD device is pre-loaded with EORE audio messages and has recently be initiated as alternative EORE tool with the challenges of COVID.

It has also been assessed as important tool mainly for young children (majority of victims in Somalia) as audio record includes short entertaining music, poem, COVID prevention messages, among others. In relation to this, MAG is currently converting into Audio-Visual animation expected to be launched in 2 months' time.



Photo 8. MRE (EORE) being conducted with women in outdoor setting.

9. Resources made available to support progress made to date

- Trained staff
- Office space
- National Mine Action Database (IMSMA)
- Approved national mine action strategy

- Drafted national mine action standard
- Drafted national Victim Assistance Action plan

10. Circumstances that impede compliance in a 10-year period

Based on input from SEMA and stakeholders the following factors were identified as significant circumstances that impeded Somalia's progress in achieving its mine action obligations within its initial 10-year period.

1. Insufficient information about the extent of the contamination
2. Insufficient information about the impact of the contamination
3. Limited access to contaminated areas by our teams because of security concerns
4. Limited access to contaminated areas to supervise our teams because of security concerns
5. Other types of contamination (such as IED) have had to take priority
6. Lack of training
7. Lack of resources
8. Lack of effective coordination and prioritisation

The security situation in Somalia

The presence of non-state armed groups also pose an acute threat to implementation, In July 2018, the SEMA central office at the Ministry of Internal Security in Mogadishu was attacked and significantly damaged, some of its staff injured, and much of SEMA's office materials, including computers and documents, were destroyed. UNMAS provided support to SEMA in the reconstruction of a solid-walled office.

Inter-communal tensions in Somalia

As previously discussed, inter-communal tensions and localised conflict continues in Somalia. The impact of inter-clan conflict limits the deployment of mine clearance teams across differing regions. This has resulted in more in-depth liaison between mine clearance operators and local elders and has complicated while also increasing the recruitment of local clans for tasks within their regions, respectively. At the same time, the completion of tasks and the need for mine clearance teams to redeployment to priority tasks in other regions can further exacerbate local tensions.

The implications of these two forms of conflict on humanitarian mine action make it difficult for implementing partners to travel to, work or supervise work in certain parts of the country. Furthermore, as the security situation is fluid, the impact of this limitation is not always predictable. Whilst the acute implications for personal security are clearly understood, the chronic situation means that it is difficult for implementing agencies to deploy personnel recruited in one clan area, to another clan area, respectively.

11. Humanitarian, economic, social and environmental implications

Armed conflict in Somalia has impacted all major economic activities. Subsequently, the impact of EO has restricted access to land and other resources. This restriction can have particularly egregious effect on the rural poor who may have little choice in using that land, in the face of other shocks or stresses.

However, due to a lack of information, the exact scale and complexity of anti-personnel landmine contamination and other types of explosive ordnance present in Somalia are not well known.

The presence of explosive hazards impacts the safety of affected communities, including returnees and internally displaced people. SEMAs 2018 National Mine Action Strategy stated that as, “much of the population is mobile (nomadic herders), with many refugees and IDPs currently gathered in urban centres but with the potential to return to their homes as the country stabilizes; and those homes may be in mine/ERW affected areas. In affected communities, mines/ERW threaten people and animals; and the evidence that people collect and carry ERW (stockpiling them for future sale or use, even using hazardous items as landmarks, decoration, or goal posts on a children’s soccer field) points to the evident need for clearance and mine/ERW risk education”.




Photo 9. Photo showing communities cutting trees for firewood in the minefield

In 2020 alone, a total of 49 ERW/mine related victims were recorded, with 76% of the deaths and injuries reported being among children. Research has shown that children are relatively at a higher risk of being victims of ERW accidents than adults. There is also evidence of practices that increase the risks to individuals and the surrounding communities, including harvesting of explosive material for economic necessity, domestic stockpiling, and the use of explosive material in commercial activities (e.g. quarry mining and digging wells). These risk-taking practices are aggravated by unemployment and the lack of awareness in the communities.



Photo 10. Mine showing harvesting of explosives

12. Nature and extent of the remaining Article 5 challenge: quantitative aspects

At the end of 2019, SEMA reported 125 suspected and confirmed mined areas across Somalia covering an estimated area of 16,200,000 square metres. It is reported that confirmed hazardous areas (CHA) containing landmines are mainly concentrated along Somalia's border with Ethiopia. Data gathered through historical surveys indicate that most recorded minefields were contaminated with anti-vehicle mines or had very minimal information about the type of contamination. Further survey is required to provide further evidence on the exact nature and extent of contamination in Somalia.




Figure 11. Somalia known Explosive Hazard Contamination (2021)

13. Nature and extent of the remaining Article 5 challenge: qualitative aspects

13.1. Mines of an improvised nature

Somalia recognises that ‘mines of an improvised nature’ pose a significant risk to the population. The 2019 Oslo Action Plan⁶ makes specific reference to such weapons. Action #21 of the Oslo Action Plan states that:

“States Parties affected by anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature will ensure that they apply all provisions and obligations under the Convention to such contamination as they do for all other types of anti-personnel mines, including during survey and clearance in fulfilment of Article 5 and disaggregate by types of mines when reporting in fulfilment of Article 7 obligations”.

Many of the items of EO found in Somalia are classified as IED.

Whilst it is currently true that most IED are not primarily designed as victim operated improvised explosive devices (VOIED). It has been reported that EO can be used as a source of the explosive main charges being used in various IED in Somalia.

13.2. Dealing with other types of contamination

While this request covers Somalia’s obligations under the Anti-personnel landmine Convention, it can be noted that responding to anti-personnel mines forms only part of Somalia’s response to explosive ordnance contamination. In this regard, *all* explosive ordnance contamination that poses a risk to the Somali population must be addressed, including AP mines. In this way, Somalia’s effort to implement its obligations under Article 5 form part of the totality of its efforts to address explosive ordnance in the country. Somalia will continue to disaggregate the challenge of anti-personnel mine contamination from other EO to the extent possible, particularly as more evidenced based survey work is undertaken.

⁶ As adopted on 29 November 2019

14. Amount of time requested and a rationale for this amount of time

Somalia is requesting a five-year extension of its deadline under Article of the Convention, from 1 October 2022 – 1 October 2027. The rationale for the period request is based on the current human, financial and technical resources available to implement Somalia's obligations under Article 5, as well as the current level of insecurity present in the country.

Somalia remains committed to fulfilling its obligations under the Convention, particularly in respect to Article 5. Somalia is committed to work towards the goals of the Oslo Action Plan, (2020-2024), including to complete the obligations as soon as possible and to the fullest extent possible by 2025. However, due to the need for further capacity building, preparation and planning of non-technical survey to be undertaken in a changing security environment. Somalia will need to request a period extending beyond the aspirational date of 2025 and will continue to keep the States Parties updated on its progress, in achieving its obligations and goals.

15. Detailed work plan for the period of the requested extension

SEMA will continue to work with stakeholders to continue lifesaving mine action activities in accessible areas while continuing national capacity building efforts to build greater coordination. It is envisaged that consultations will continue through 2021 and a detailed costed work plan together will be presented in addition to this request in 2021.

The work plan below is built on two key components:

- i) Building the national capacity of SEMA, and,
- ii) Continued implementation of land release activities in secure areas.

A two-phase approach will be adopted to implement activities under the respective components.

Phase 1. Present - 1 October 2022)

Phase 2. (1 October 2022 – 1 October 2027)

The 2019 Oslo Action Plan (OAP) includes significant detail on how to operationalise the clearance and mine risk education activities, together with indicators for measuring progress. In formulating the work plan Somalia has considered key elements of the OAP.

Phase One

This phase covers the period from the present time to –1 October 2022. This phase includes the continuation of capacity building of national demining institutions, and land release activities. As part of activities to be implemented in this phase, SEMA initiated a series of stakeholder meetings in early 2021, including a technical operational meeting to discuss activities under the work plan for Phase 1. Planned technical meetings for EORE (MRE) were also planned but were postponed due to the current pandemic. It is envisaged that frequent and regular technical meetings, together with broader national level dialogues will be hosted by SEMA in order to develop a more detailed and structured plan to be presented in addition to this request in 2021.

Somalia recognises the value of the United Nations Gender Guidelines for Mine Action Programmes⁷ in developing an inclusive gender policy for mine action. This policy will be developed as part of Phase One of Somalia's work plan, including reference to the following key principles:

- All NTS teams must be meaningfully gender-balanced
- The voices of all demographic groups (men, women boys and girls) will be heard as valid and equal sources of information in the NTS
- The rights of all demographic groups (men, women boys and girls) will be treated fairly and equally in decisions on prioritisation of clearance work
- All implementing agencies will be encouraged to adopt gender-sensitive recruitment procedures in all mine action projects.

1. Build the capacity of national demining institutions SEMA (OAP Action #1 and #44)

1.1. Needs assessment of requirements to a development of a sustainable national capacity.

1.2 Detailed review of Somali national mine action Standards (NMAS) (OAP Action #5).

1.3 Review of prioritisation procedures (OAP Actions #3 and #6)

1.4 Approval of National Mine Action Plan, including

1.4.1 Gender action plan (OAP Action #3).

1.4.2 Resource Mobilisation plan

1.4.3 Mine Risk Education

⁷ 3rd Edition (2019). See

https://www.mineaction.org/sites/default/files/publications/mine_action_gender_guidelines_web_0.pdf

2. Continuation of land release activities

2.1 Preparation and implementation of community-based clearance mechanisms.

2.2 Planning and implementation of MRE Workplan

2.3. Non-technical survey

2.3.1 Conduct NTS in accessible areas (OAP Actions #2, #8, #18, #19)

2.3.2 Desktop review of data held in SEMA information management system

Phase Two

The second phase of this work plan covers the period 1 October 2022 – 1 October 2027. During this period Somalia will continue with the activities described in Phase 1, at the start of the extension deadline (1 October 2022).

This phase will bring greater focus to the planning and Implementation of non-technical survey in currently accessible areas (NTS) in order to identify to the extent possible, the precise perimeter of mined areas.

16. Institutional, human resource and material capacity to implement the plan

Somalia currently has 6 international agencies supporting the implementation of its mine action Programme, (DDG, The HALO Trust, MAG, NPA, UNMAS, UOS) as well as national consortia. While the current COVID-19 pandemic has impacted the efforts of all operators, the capacity of the Somalia Government and implementing partners to adapt and adopt changes to external shocks, reveals the overall cooperation present in the programme.

Current Capacities

The following international organisations and local consortia are currently present in Somalia.

South west State

- Halo El Barde in Southwest State – manual demining and EORE/CL
- DDG Baidoa in Southwest State – CB support to SPF EOD, EORE
- MAG Afgoye in Southwest State - EORE (through JUMAN LNGO)
- UOS Yeed and El Barde in Southwest State – Manual demining,

Hirshabelle State

- HALO: Mataban and Beletweyne in Hirshabelle State – manual demining, EOD, EORE/CL

- UOS: Beletweyne and Mataban in Hirshabelle State – Manual demining, MTT/EOD mobile

Galmudug State

- HALO: Gurceel, Dhusamareb and Dhabad in Galmudug State – manual demining, EOD, EORE/CL
- UOS: Dhabad and South Galkayo – Manual demining, MTT/EOD mobile,

Puntland State

- HALO: Galdogob in Puntland State – manual demining, EORE
- NPA: Galdogob and Burtinle in Puntland State - manual demining teams, MDD, EORE teams.
- NPA: Buhoodle in the disputed land (Puntland and Somaliland) - manual demining teams, MDD.

Jubaland State

- MAG: Kismayo in Jubaland State –EORE (through JUMAN LNGO) and WAM
- UOS: Dollo in Jubaland State – MTT/EOD mobile,
- DDG: Dollo and Kismayo in Jubaland State – EORE

Somaliland State

- HALO: operating on Ethiopia border in Somaliland State – manual demining, EOD, EORE/CL.

Mogadishu

- DDG: Banadir Regional Administration (Mogadishu) – EORE
- MAG: Banadir Regional Administration (Mogadishu) - EORE (through JUMAN LNGO) and WAM.
- UOS: Banadir Regional Administration – MTT/EOD mobile.

The following table summarises the current operators, and locations present in Somalia.

Table: States and Locations of Implementing Partners, Somalia

State	Location	Operator	Activities		
South West State	El Barde	HALO	CL	EORE	
		UOS	CL	MTT	EORE

	Baidoa	DDG	CB	EORE	
	Afgoye	MAG		EORE	
	Yeed	UOS	CL	MTT	EORE
Hirshabelle State	Mataban / Beletweyne	HALO	EOD	EORE	
		UOS	CL	MTT	EORE
Galmudug	Gurceel	HALO	CL	EORE	
	Dhusamareb	HALO	CL	EORE	
	Dhabad	HALO	CL	EORE	
		UOS	CL	MTT	EORE
South Galkyo	UOS	MTT	EORE		
Puntland State	Galdogob	HALO	CL	EORE	
		NPA	CL	MDD	EORE
	Burtinle	NPA	CL	MDD	EORE
	Buhoodle	NPA	CL	MDD	
Jubaland State	Kismayo	MAG	EORE	WAM	
	Dollo	UOS	MTT	EORE	
Somaliland State	Border Areas	HALO	CL	EOD	EORE / CL
Mogadishu	Banadir	DDG	EORE		
		MAG	EORE	WAM	
		UOS	MTT	EORE	

Table 4. States and locations of Implementing Partners, Somalia

Over the coming three-year period (Jul 2021 – Jun 2024), UNMAS has a plan to continue deploying contracted teams including two demining teams in Gedo region, two teams in Bakool, two teams in Hiran and two teams in Galgaduud regions. Likewise, two mobile multi-tasking teams will roam across the states to respond EOD callouts. Besides, ten facilitator's teams and eight community liaison officers will continue delivering EORE activities across the liberated regions of southern and central parts of Somalia (Gedo, Lower Juba, Lower Shabelle, Bay, Bakool, Middle Shabelle, Hiran, Galgaduud and Mudug).

16.1. Estimated Budget for Work Plan Activities

At the moment, SEMA is reliant on foreign financial resources. This is largely due to the current economic situation in Somalia. However, a budget proposal for SEMA has been submitted to the Ministry of Internal Security (MOIS). It is hoped that formal approval of

SEMA together with allocations from the State budget will improve to facilitate future contributions of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), as well as leverage international support to SEMA.

In the meantime, SEMA is currently working with stakeholders on a national capacity building plan, together with a more detailed and costed operational work plan, including desktop survey and non-technical survey. During 2021 a detailed budget will be produced for the work plan together with a resource mobilisation strategy for the activities provided in the work plan of the extension request.

The estimated annual cost for implementing the current work plan is estimated to be US \$6,400,000 per year. This includes:

- | | |
|---|--------------------------|
| 1. SEMA operations at Federal and State levels (5 Offices): | US \$900,000 per year |
| 2. UN agency support to Article Five compliance: | US \$500,000 per year |
| 3. Implementation of projected land release | US \$5,000,000 per year. |

16.2. What risks / assumptions are made regarding the realisation of the plan?

The following risks/ assumptions are made regarding the realisation of the plan.

1. Security. Somalia is beset by a number of security challenges. This work plan assumes there will be improvement in the current security situation in order to carry out non-technical survey in as many accessible areas as necessary. Somalia will continue to keep the States Parties apprised of its progress in implementing its work plan under Article 5 on an annual basis through its Article 7 reports and at Meetings of the States Parties.

2. Productivity. Somalia will support innovation in mine action that can improve efficiency and effectiveness of land release methodologies in accordance with OAP Action #27.

3. Funding. Current capacity building and land release is funded by external donors through SEMA's implementing partners at present. Significant reduction in funding will have an overall impact on coordination and productivity.