

Federal Government of Somalia

**The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use,
Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-
Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction**

Request:

**For an extension of the deadline for completing
the destruction of anti-personnel mines in mined
areas in accordance with Article 5**

September 2021

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Abbreviations and acronyms

| Acronym/abbreviation | Meaning |
|----------------------|---|
| AMISOM | African Union Mission in Somalia |
| AP | Anti-personnel [mine] |
| APMBC | Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention |
| AT/AV | Anti-Tank/Anti-Vehicle [mine] |
| BAC | Battle Area Clearance |
| BBC | British Broadcasting Corporation |
| CHA | Confirmed Hazardous Area |
| CMC | Cluster Munition Convention |
| CMD | Conventional munition disposal |
| CMR | Cluster munition remnant |
| DEC | Development evaluation criteria |
| DDG | Danish Demining Group |
| EO | Explosive ordnance |
| EOD | Explosive ordnance disposal |
| EORE | Explosive ordnance risk education (formerly MRE) |
| ERW | Explosive remnants of war |
| ETC | Estimated time of completion |
| FGD | Focus group discussion |
| FGS | Federal Government of Somalia |
| FMS | Federal member states |
| GDP | Gross domestic product |
| GICHD | Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining |
| HALO | (formerly the HALO Trust) |
| HMA | Humanitarian Mine Action |
| ICBL | International Campaign to Ban Landmines |
| ICRC | International Committee of the Red Cross |
| IDP | Internally displaced person(s) |
| IED | Improvised explosive device |
| IHL | International humanitarian law |
| IMAS | International Mine Action Standards |
| IMSMA | Information Management System for Mine Action |
| KABP | Knowledge, attitude, belief and practices [survey] |
| KII | Key informant interview |
| LIS | Landmine impact survey |
| LSA | Land service ammunition |
| MAC | Mine action centre |
| MAG | (formerly the Mines Advisory Group) |

| (a) | (b) |
|--------|---|
| MAR | Mine Action Review |
| MCA | Multi-criteria analysis |
| MDD | Mine detecting dogs |
| MMC | Manual mine clearance |
| MOIS | Ministry of Internal Security |
| MRE | Mine Risk Education (see EORE) |
| NGO | Non-governmental organisation |
| NMAA | National Mine Action Authority |
| NMAS | National Mine Action Standards |
| NOTAM | Notice to airmen |
| NTS | Non-technical survey |
| NPA | Norwegian People's Aid |
| OAP | Oslo Action Plan (2019) |
| PMAC | Puntland Mine Action Centre |
| QA | Quality assurance |
| QC | Quality control |
| QM | Quality management |
| SEMA | Somali Explosives Management Authority |
| SGBV | Sexual and gender based violence |
| SHA | Suspect hazardous area/suspected hazard area |
| SMAP | Somali Mine Action Programme |
| SNA | Somali National Army |
| SNMAA | Somali National Mine Action Authority |
| SOP | Standard operation procedure(s) |
| TNMA | Technical note on mine action [supporting IMAS] |
| TS | Technical survey |
| UN | United Nations |
| UNDP | UN Development Programme |
| UNMAS | UN Mine Action Service |
| UNOPS | UN Office for Project Services |
| UNSF | UN Strategic Framework |
| UNSOMA | UN Somalia Mine Action [Programme] |
| UNSOM | United Nations Assistance Mission In Somalia |
| UNSOS | United Nations Support Office In Somalia |
| UOS | Ukroboronservice |
| UXO | Unexploded ordnance |
| VOIED | Victim-operated IED |
| WAM | Weapons and ammunition management |

I. Executive Summary

Introduction

Somalia acceded to the Convention on 16 April 2012 and the Convention entered into force for Somalia on 1 October 2012. Since entry into force, Somalia has committed to implementing its Article 5 Mine Clearance obligations under the Convention. While significant progress in implementation has been achieved, due to several challenges Somalia has been unable to achieve completion by its original Article 5 deadline of 1 October 2022. In response, this extension request highlights achievements made during Somalia's original ten-year deadline, as well as those circumstances that have impeded progress. The request proposes an extension of Somalia's deadline for five years, including a forward looking detailed and costed multi-year work plan for capacity building, land release and mine risk education activities for the period of the requested extension, 1 October 2022- 1 October 2027.

Origin of the Article 5 challenge

The history of armed conflict in Somalia dates back to the Ethiopian-Somali wars of 1964, and 1977–1978. Since this period, Somalia has witnessed repeated conflict in five Federal State Administrations and Somaliland¹. As a result of repeated conflicts Somalia is contaminated with anti-personnel mines (APM) and other explosive remnants of war (ERW). APM / ERW contamination is known to exist along Somalia's border regions with Ethiopia and within Somalia around towns, military installations, often within distance of civilian infrastructure. A baseline of anti-personnel mine contamination has been difficult to establish with limited accessibility to mined areas during periods of conflict .

Nature and extent of progress made since entry into force

Somalia's efforts to respond to the complex contamination present in the country, includes actions taken before entry into force of the Convention, (1 October 2012).

[1] One artefact of the Somali conflict of 1991 is the state of Somaliland. The State of Somaliland remains part of Somalia de jure and is therefore under the jurisdiction of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS). However due to the current situation regarding control, Somalia is unable to plan, coordinate or conduct survey and clearance operations in Somaliland and will focus its activities on the remaining states of Somalia. The FGS will keep this situation under review and will report any change in its Article 7 reports.

The establishment of State based Mine Action Centers was undertaken with the support of UNDP during 1999-2007, and since 2008 with the support of UNMAS. On 4th December 2011, Somalia established the Somalia National Mine Action Authority (SNMAA). In August 2013, the Somalia Explosive Management Authority (SEMA) was established by Presidential decree under the Ministry of Internal Security, replacing the SNMAA². SEMA was afforded an office at Federal level, and five (5) State based offices in, (Puntland, Jubaland, South West State, Galmudug, and Hirshabelle).

Early efforts to quantify anti-personnel landmine contamination in the country include two landmine impact surveys (LIS) conducted in three phases during the period 2002-2008, in the States of Somaliland and Puntland, at the time the South-Central part of the country was not included in the survey. As a result of these surveys over 1,300 hazard areas, including all types of explosive ordnance, were identified. In 2008, localised surveys began to estimate the level of contamination in Hirshabelle State, Bakool and Bay; South West State, and Hiraan. These surveys reported one in ten communities surveyed to be contaminated by APM and/or ERW. During this time, contaminated areas were also reported along the border with Ethiopia, in Galguduud and Gedo regions.

During 2012, a re-survey of hazard areas in identified during the LIS was undertaken by HALO and DDG in Somaliland. Somalia in its initial Article 7 report (2013) reported 333 mined areas known to contain anti-personnel mines as remaining from previous LIS surveys. However, further efforts to identify the number of square metres has proven difficult, and it should be noted that most recorded information is restricted to accessible areas.

During the period 2015-2016, a non-technical survey was undertaken by the HALO Trust in 3 regions, (Bakool; South West State, Galgaduud; Galmudug State, and Hiraan; Hirshabelle State). As a result, a total of 75 mined areas and one battlefield area were identified together measuring 6,052,744 square metres. In total, Somalia for the period 2015-2020 addressed 9 mined areas measuring 1,665,450 square metres, including 8 Confirmed Hazardous areas measuring 1,630,450 square metres and 1 SHA measuring 35,000 square metres.

Due to the ongoing nature of conflict survey efforts were constrained to specific geographical areas with the nature and extent of the original Article 5 challenge difficult to quantify. The

² Decree 107, dated 6 Aug 2013

overall extent of APM contamination remains largely unknown and complex, including recontamination of previously cleared areas, accessible stockpiles of weapons and ammunition, and the reported use of improvised explosive devices (IED) by non-state armed groups.

Circumstances impeding compliance within period of extension request

While the current COVID-19 pandemic has impacted the efforts of all operators, the capacity of the Somalia Government and implementing partners to adapt and adopt changes to external shocks reveals the overall cooperation present in the programme. The following factors were identified as significant circumstances that impeded Somalia's progress in achieving its mine action obligations within its initial 10-year period.

1. Insufficient information about the extent of the contamination
2. Insufficient information about the impact of the contamination
3. Limited access to contaminated areas because of security concerns
4. Other types of contamination (such as IED) have had to take priority
5. Lack of training
6. Lack of resources
7. Lack of effective coordination and prioritization

Humanitarian, economic, social and environmental implications

Armed conflict in Somalia has impacted all major economic activities. Subsequently, the impact of explosive ordnance (EO), including APM has restricted access to land and other resources, limiting economic opportunities for affected communities. The impact of APM have particularly egregious effects on the rural poor who may have little choice in using contaminated land, posing a risk of potential loss of life, serious injury and/or disability, in the face of other shocks or stresses. The presence of explosive hazards directly impacts the safety of affected communities, including returnees and internally displaced people.

Remaining Challenge

As of 31 December 2020, the known remaining challenge in Somalia for all explosive devices of 161, 806, 388 square metres.

Contamination data gathered through historical surveys are considered outdated with more recent conflict resulting in recontamination of some areas. Database clean-up efforts have been undertaken to remove "closed" hazardous areas from the database. At this time, due to a lack of resources to deploy sufficient survey teams and lack of access to areas due to ongoing security concerns a more detailed estimate of mine contamination is not able to be made in

Somalia. The table below summarises Somalia's known explosive ordnance contamination, including mixed minefields and battle areas, in which APM have been identified as of 31 December 2020.

| Federal Member State | District | CHA | CHA | CHA | CHA | CHA | CHA | CHA | SHA | SHA | Grand Total |
|----------------------|------------|---------|------------------|---------------|------------|-------------|------------|-----------|--------|------------|-------------|
| | | AP/AT | AP/AT/CM/UXO/AXO | AP/AT/UXO/AXO | AP/UXO/AXO | AT | AT/UXO/AXO | UXO/AXO | AT | AT/UXO/AXO | |
| Galmudug | Abudwaq | | | 593,796 | | 143,285,458 | 548,632 | 8,236 | 40,643 | | 144,476,765 |
| Galmudug | Balanbale | 884,387 | | 1,220,115 | | 59,364 | 454,147 | | | | 2,618,013 |
| Galmudug | Dusmareb | | 784,352 | | | | 329,113 | 2,087,013 | | | 3,200,478 |
| Hirshabelle | Beletweyne | | | 22,853 | | 667,829 | 4,498,677 | 195,874 | 52,270 | 15,053 | 5,452,556 |
| Hirshabelle | Mataban | | | | 240,835 | 463,784 | 837,590 | | | 57,124 | 1,599,333 |
| Hirshabelle | Maxaas | | | 118,234 | | | | | | | 118,234 |
| SouthWest | Ceel Barde | 112,904 | | 2,121,360 | | 269,610 | 1,050,745 | | | | 3,554,619 |
| SouthWest | Yeed | | | | | | 786,379 | | | | 786,379 |
| Grand Total | | 997,291 | 784,352 | 4,076,358 | 240,835 | 144,746,045 | 8,505,283 | 2,291,134 | 92,913 | 72,177 | 161,806,388 |

Table 1. Summary of Somalia's remaining challenge (all explosive ordnance) as of 31 December 2020

Requested time for extension

Somalia is requesting a five-year extension of its deadline under Article of the Convention, 1 October 2022 – 1 October 2027.

Rationale for the time requested

The rationale for the period request is based on several factors, including the current level of insecurity present in the country that limits access to contaminated areas and the current human, financial and technical resources available to implement Somalia's obligations under Article 5.

Work plan

SEMA will continue to work with stakeholders to continue lifesaving mine action activities. It must be noted that as the security situation in Somalia is volatile and constantly changing an adaptable working plan to the prioritization must be retained.

In this way, the work plan aims to continue national capacity building efforts of SEMA to build greater coordination while also continuing work with stakeholders to ensure lifesaving mine action activities in accessible areas are implemented. The 2019 Oslo Action Plan (OAP) outlines best practices on the implementation of survey, clearance and mine risk education activities, together with indicators for measuring progress. In formulating the work plan Somalia has considered key elements of the OAP, including Actions #23 and #24. Somalia recognises

the value of the United Nations Gender Guidelines for Mine Action Programmes³ in developing an inclusive gender policy for mine action. This policy will be developed as part of Phase One of Somalia's work plan. A two-phase approach will be adopted to implement activities:

Phase 1. Present - 1 October 2022

Phase 2. 1 October 2022 – 1 October 2027

Both Phases will include the following two components; i) Building the national capacity of SEMA, ii) Continued implementation of land release and mine risk education activities in secure areas.

Phase One: Present time to 1 October 2022

Component 1: Building the national capacity of SEMA

Three objectives of component one are given below with detailed activities and an estimated timeline for completion given in the detailed narrative, (page 51).

Further develop SEMA's administrative capacity

Further develop and sustain an effective information management system for Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA), Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), and Risk Education (RE)

Further develop an effective, independent, and organic Quality Assurance capacity within SEMA

Somalia recognises the value of the United Nations Gender Guidelines for Mine Action Programmes⁴ in developing an inclusive gender policy for mine action. This policy will be developed as part of Phase One of Somalia's work plan.

Component 2: Continued implementation of land release and mine risk education activities in secure areas.

Component 2 seeks to equip SEMA and the Somalia Mine Action Programme with the capacity building support and partnerships to ensure the continuation of land release and mine risk education activities in secure areas. Component two is comprised of the following two key activities:

1) Development of non-technical survey plan for secure areas

³ 3rd Edition (2019). See

https://www.mineaction.org/sites/default/files/publications/mine_action_gender_guidelines_web_0.pdf

⁴ 3rd Edition (2019). See

https://www.mineaction.org/sites/default/files/publications/mine_action_gender_guidelines_web_0.pdf

SEMA is cooperating with UNDP and one implementing partner (to be confirmed), to launch a capacity building 12-month project in 2021. The project will initiate a pilot non-technical survey in the fourth quarter of 2021. This pilot is aimed to build SEMA's capacity to undertake a nationwide non-technical survey in Phase Two. The support aims to build administrative capacity in SEMA to improve their administrative functioning, including supporting one existing staff position in SEMA to enable the implementation of the programme.

2) Continuation of Land Release and Mine Risk Education activities in secure areas
SEMA will continue to work with implementing partners to ensure land release activities are implemented in secure areas throughout Phase One. SEMA will also work to ensure that Mine Risk Education is carried out in communities targeted for land release and other at-risk groups as identified by SEMA and humanitarian partners in coordination with land release operations. This component is comprised of 2 activities:

1. Deployment of implementing partners to undertake land release activities in secure areas
2. Deployment of implementing partners to undertake Mine Risk Education activities

As part of this component implementing partners will be deployed to accessible areas with consideration given to the following prioritisation criteria. The current locations of operations and current capacities of implementing partners are given below.

| | |
|--|----------------------|
| Urban areas | Confrontational area |
| Community infrastructure | Population size |
| Borderline of Somalia / Ethiopia | Accessibility |
| Confirmed hazard areas and accident area | IDPS-Returnees |
| Sequence to EORE, NT, TS, Demining | |

Table 2. Prioritisation Criteria for land release tasking

Phase Two: 1 October 2022 – 1 October 2027

The second phase of this work plan covers the period 1 October 2022 – 1 October 2027 of the extension period. In terms of capacity building this phase will bring greater focus to information management and quality assurance initiated in Phase One. With regard to the implementation of non-technical survey in currently accessible areas based on the timing and outcome of the NTS pilot undertaken in Phase One. It is expected that SEMA's capacity will be built to coordinate a nationwide non-technical survey in Phase Two, (with consideration given to security and access to mined areas). In order to identify to the extent possible, the precise perimeter of mined areas. This phase will also continue lifesaving land release and mine risk education activities.

During Phase One a detailed budget together with a resource mobilisation strategy will be produced for activities in Phase 2 of the work plan. SEMA plans to develop a national plan for resources mobilization in collaboration with mine action stakeholders in Somalia, the government and donor countries with a more detailed and costed operational work plan, including capacity building, non-technical survey, and mine risk education for Phase Two. Somalia intends to keep States Parties apprised of its progress, with the updated work plan submitted as part of Somalia's Article 7 transparency report, 30 April 2023.

Institutional, human resource and material capacity to implement the plan

Somalia currently has 7 international agencies supporting the implementation of its mine action Programme, (DDG, The HALO Trust, MAG, NPA, UNMAS, UOS, and UNDP) as well as national consortia. While the current COVID-19 pandemic has impacted the efforts of all operators, the capacity of the Somalia Government and implementing partners to adapt and adopt changes to external shocks, reveals the overall cooperation present in the programme. The following international organisations and local consortia are currently present in Somalia.

Danish Demining Group (DDG): Has been in Somalia since 2007, operating across Somaliland, Puntland and South-central undertaking survey, EOD and EORE activities. DDG has recently merged to DRC and continues providing EORE activities in Banadir and Baidoa areas. DDG has started its HMA activities in norther regions (Somaliland) in 1991 after the conflict ended.

The HALO Trust: Has been in Somalia since 2015 where it conducted significant survey along border areas with Ethiopia, (2015-2017). HALO will deploy two manual clearance teams and two EORE teams under current contract with UNMAS. HALO is running multi-donor projects undertaking Survey, land release, EORE and PSSM activities in various regions of the country including in Somaliland, Puntland and Southcentral. HALO Trust has been active in Somaliland in since 1999 providing mine clearance and EORE in northern Somalia regions, making significant progress towards fully eliminating the landmine threats.

Mine Advisory Group (MAG): Has been in Somalia since 2009, initially working in Puntland and undertaking work in support of Ammunition management and EORE. MAG will continue operating in Somalia mainly EORE activities MAG has its currently piloting an animated EORE messages which will be relevant audio-visual aid in the country.

Norwegian People's Aid (NPA): Present in Somalia since 2015, providing capacity building support to SEMA HQ and state offices, EORE and clearance operations. NPA continues

operations in Puntland state of Somalia conducting survey, database management and capacity building to SEMA Puntland personnel on EORE and survey.

Ukroboronservice (UOS): has been in Somalia as a commercial company and will be operational under UNMAS contracts until July 2024 undertaking clearance in the above districts along the border areas and EORE across the regions.

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP): Is cooperating with SEMA to initiate a 12 month capacity building project in July 2021 to support SEMA and an implementing partner to initiate a pilot non-technical survey in the fourth quarter of 2021.

United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS): will continue providing capacity building support. Besides, UNMAS has contracted mine action operators, UOS, for the coming three years (Jul 2021 – Jun 2024). UOS will deploy 8 manual clearance sections across the areas – Dollo, Elbarde, Beletweyne and Dhabad areas. Besides, UOS will also deploy 10 EORE teams and 8 community liaison officers across 10 regions of Somalia. Similarly, UNMAS will continue the contract with HALO to deploy two manual mine clearance teams and two EORE teams to work in Dhabad and Galdogob areas until December 2021. UNMAS main focus in Somalia is supporting AMISOM and security forces in IED Threat Mitigation efforts.

| <u>S/N</u> | <u>Organization</u> | <u>MA Capacity</u> | <u>Regions</u> |
|------------|------------------------------|-------------------------------|---|
| 1. | UNMAS Contractor (UOS) | 8x MMC Sections of 4 Teams | Hiran, Bakol, Galgadud and Gedo |
| 2. | | 2x QRT/EOD Teams (Mobile) | Gedo, Bakol, Hiran, Galgadud, Bay, Lower-shabelle, Middle-shabelle, Mudug, Lower-juba, and Banadir. |
| 3. | | 10x EROE Teams | Gedo, Bakol, Hiran, Galgadud, Bay, Lower-shabelle, Middle-shabelle, Mudug, Lower-juba, and Banadir |
| 4. | | 8x Community Liaison Officers | Gedo, Bakol, Hiran, Galgadud, Bay, Lower-shabelle, Middle-shabelle, and Lower-juba, |
| 5. | UNMAS EU funded (HALO Trust) | 2x EORE Teams | Galgadud and Mudug |
| 6. | | 2x MMC | Galgadud and Mudug |
| 7. | HALO Trust | 20x MMC/NTS | Galgadud, Mudug, Hiran, & Bakol |
| 8. | | 8x EORE/COT | Galgadud, Mudug, Hiran, & Bakol |

| | | | |
|-----|------------------------|---|----------------------------------|
| 9. | | 3x WAM | Galgadud, Mudug, Hiran, & Bakol |
| 10. | Norwegian People's Aid | 4 x MMC | Galgadud and Mudug |
| 11. | | 2x MDD | Mudug |
| 12. | | 1x EORE | Nugal |
| 13. | DRC/DDG | 5x EORE | Bay, Lowerjuba, Gedo and Banadir |
| 14. | MAG | Focusing on development of digital EORE and polices | |

Estimated Budget for Work Plan Activities

At the moment, SEMA is heavily reliant on international financial resources. A budget proposal for SEMA has been submitted to the Ministry of Internal Security (MOIS). It is hoped that formal approval of SEMA together with allocations from the State budget will improve to facilitate future contributions of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), as well as leverage international support to SEMA. In the meantime, SEMA is currently working with stakeholders on a national capacity building plan, together with a more detailed and costed operational work plan, including desktop survey and non-technical survey.

During Phase One, a detailed budget will be produced for Phase Two of the work plan together with a resource mobilisation strategy for the activities provided in Phase 2. SEMA plans to develop a national plan for resources mobilization in collaboration with mine action stakeholders in Somalia, the government and donor countries with a more detailed and costed operational work plan, including desktop survey and non-technical survey provided for Phase Two of the work plan. Somalia intends to keep States Parties apprised of its progress, with the updated work plan submitted as part of Somalia's Article 7 transparency report, 30 April 2023. At the present time until 1 October 2022, the estimated annual cost for implementing the current work plan is estimated to be US \$6,400,000 per year. This includes:

1. SEMA operations at Federal and State levels (5 Offices): US \$900,000 per year
2. UN agency support to Article Five compliance: US \$500,000 per year
3. Implementation of projected land release activities⁵ US \$5,000,000 per year.

Assumptions / Risks

⁵ Please note: All mine action organisations operating in Somalia will incorporate explosive ordnance risk education interventions into the respective projects.

The following assumptions and risks are made regarding the realisation of the plan.

1. Security. Somalia is beset by a number of security challenges. This work plan assumes the security situation will remain stable in order to carry out non-technical survey in all currently accessible locations with the scope to increase the number of locations for survey when the security situation improves. Somalia will continue to keep the States Parties apprised of its progress in implementing its work plan under Article 5 on an annual basis through its Article 7 reports and at Meetings of the States Parties.

2. Productivity. Somalia will support innovation in mine action that can improve efficiency and effectiveness of land release methodologies in accordance with OAP Action #27.

3. Funding. Current capacity building and land release is funded by external donors through SEMA's implementing partners at present. Significant reduction in funding will have an overall impact on coordination and productivity.

Current accessibility as of 1 September 2021

Vast locations of Somalia remain vulnerable to the persisting threat from anti-government elements, and the sporadic inter-clan conflict in some parts of the country. This limits the ease and safe access of mine action teams to the areas in need of clearance responses. Despite these challenges, there are several districts with evidence of contamination that are accessible for humanitarian mine action operators in Somalia.

Accessible areas: areas with evidence of contaminations are mainly located along the border with Ethiopia including Dollo, Luuq, Yeed, Elbarde, Wajid, Huddur, Beletweyne, Mataban, Dhusamareb, Guriceel, Abuduwaq, Balamble, Adado, Dhabad, Galkayo, Galdogob, Burtinle, Eyl. Sool and Sanaag up to regions in northern Somalia (Somaliland) Some of the above areas are accessible only to certain buffer zone from the major towns. Districts in Somaliland, Puntland and majority of Galmudug are mainly accessible for Mine Action operations while areas in the southern and central part of Somalia (Hirshabelle, Southwest, Banadir and Jubaland) remain accessible in major towns with buffer zone and districts along the Somali, Ethiopian border where majority of the mine fields in the country are located.

Inaccessible areas: There are districts completely controlled by the armed groups where access is restricted and little, or no evidence of contamination could be obtained. These include Buale district, Sakow district, Jilib district, Rabdhure district, Tieglo district, Sablale district, Adan yabal, Halgen, El bur, El dher. Despite most are located away from the border areas, it is hard to confirm the absence of contaminations.

II. Detailed Narrative

1. Introduction

Somalia acceded to the Convention on 16 April 2012 and the Convention entered into force for Somalia on 1 October 2012. Since entry into force, Somalia has committed to implementing its Article 5 Mine Clearance obligations under the Convention. While significant progress in implementation has been achieved, due to several challenges Somalia has been unable to achieve completion by its original Article 5 deadline of 1 October 2022. In response, this extension request highlights achievements made during Somalia's original ten-year deadline, as well as those circumstances that have impeded progress. The request proposes an extension of Somalia's deadline for five years, including a forward looking detailed and costed multi-year work plan for capacity building, land release and mine risk education activities for the period of the requested extension, 1 October 2022- 1 October 2027.

2. Origins of the Article 5 implementation challenge

The history of armed conflict in Somalia dates to the Ethiopian-Somali wars of 1964, and 1977– 1978. Since this period, Somalia has witnessed repeated conflict in five states of the country and Somaliland⁶, Conflict during this period is characterised by the following;

1988-1991 Armed rebel's vs Military Government

1992- 2005 Civil War,

2006-2007 Islamic Courts vs Ethiopia Forces

Conflict with extremist groups (SNA, supported by AMISOM).

⁶ One artefact of the Somali conflict of 1991 is the state of Somaliland. The State of Somaliland remains part of Somalia de jure and is therefore under the jurisdiction of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS). However due to the current situation, the State of Somaliland is not – at the moment - fully under the de facto control of the FGS for the purposes of planning, coordinating and conducting the clearance of anti-personnel mines. Until this temporary situation is resolved, Somalia interprets its current obligations under the Convention to encompass APM contamination in the remaining states of Somalia. The FGS will keep this situation under review and will report any change in its Article 7 reports.

As a result of these periods of conflict Somalia is contaminated with anti-personnel mines (APM) and other explosive remnants of war (ERW). APM / ERW contamination is known to exist along Somalia’s border regions with Ethiopia and within Somalia around towns, military installations, often within distance of civilian infrastructure.

A baseline of anti-personnel mine contamination has been difficult to verify with limited accessibility to secure areas during periods of conflict . Indeed, due to the ongoing nature of conflict the overall extent of APM contamination remains largely unknown and complex, including recontamination of previously cleared areas, accessible stockpiles of weapons and ammunition, and the reported use of improvised explosive devices (IED) by non-state armed groups. In this context, the response of Somalia to its obligations under Article 5 forms part of its overall response to explosive ordnance in the country.




Figure 1. Estimated contamination in South-Central Somalia, (1977-1993)

3. Nature and extent of the original Article 5 challenge: quantitative aspects

Anti-personnel contamination (APM) is located along border areas between Somalia and Ethiopia, including the States of Galmudug, Puntland, Jubaland, South West State and Somaliland. While several surveys have been undertaken to quantify the nature and extent of this contamination, they were constrained by security challenges.



Photo 1. P4MK1 AP mine found in Waberi, Dhusamareb, Galgaduud Region, 2020 (photo: The HALO Trust)

As a result, survey efforts were constrained to specific geographical areas with nature and extent of the original Article 5 challenge difficult to quantify. Currently, some areas of Somalia remain in active conflict, presenting a complex nature of historical contamination, including reports of recontamination or cleared areas that continues to impact local populations, hinder the use of roads and prevent infrastructure development.




Figure 2. Somalia Explosive Hazard Contamination (All types of EO), (2004-2012).

4. National Demining structures

Somalia has undertaken several efforts to respond to the complex contamination present in the country before entry into force of the Convention (1 October 2012). State based Mine Action

Centres were established with the support of UNDP during the period, 1999-2007, and since 2008 with the support of UNMAS.

On the 4th December 2011, Somalia established the Somalia National Mine Action Authority (SNMAA). In August 2013, the Somalia Explosive Management Authority (SEMA) was established by Presidential decree 107 under the Ministry of Internal Security replacing the SNMAA⁷. SEMA was afforded an office at Federal level, and five (5) State based offices in, (Puntland, Jubaland, South West State, Galmudug, and Hirshabelle).

⁷ Decree 107, dated 6 Aug 2013




Figure 3. SEMA Organisational Structure

Under the Presidential Decree SEMA assumes full responsibility for the coordination of all five pillars of mine action, (mine clearance, advocacy, mine risk education, stockpile destruction and victim assistance), and WAM. The Federal SEMA is also responsible to oversee humanitarian mine action activities by conducting quality management, coordination, and prioritization. At the strategic level, SEMA is focused on strategic matters, including representing Somalia in international treaty related meetings and conferences, reporting against treaty obligations and leading resource mobilization activities.



Photo 2. Mr. Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, Director General of the Somalia Explosive Management Authority presenting an update in progress of Somalia's commitments under Article 5 to the Fourth Review Conference, Oslo, Norway, 2019

In support of this transition, legislation together with a supporting budget for SEMA was drafted and sent to Federal Parliament for approval. While SEMA retains authority for mine action it has yet to be approved funding allocations from the State budget. In 2015, UNMAS handed over coordination of the information management system as well as national technical mine action standards and guidelines (NTSG). In 2017, SEMA developed a National Strategy for Mine Action (2018-2020) that outlined five goals:

Goal 1: To enhance the capacity and capability of SEMA to lead, direct and enable effective and efficient mine action and explosives management in Somalia.

Goal 2: To develop the Somali mine action consortia into a wholly national capacity delivering appropriate HMA support to all member states, safely, efficiently and in accordance with national and international standards, expectations and requirements.

Goal 3: to engage with stakeholders in order to understand, and better respond to, their needs, preferences and expectations in relation to the impact of mines and ERW contamination in Somalia.

Goal 4: To reduce the risks faced by the people of Somalia to allow them to go about their lives free from the impacts of mines and ERW.

Goal 5: To comply, so far as is reasonably practicable, with the requirements of those treaties to which Somalia is a signatory and which are relevant to the mine and explosives management programme.

In 2017, Somalia included mine action in its National Development Plan, (2017-2019), noting that, “The conflict in Somalia has left behind a legacy of Explosives Remnants of War (ERW), including landmines and munitions....ERW continues to be a security concern for sustainable development initiatives and removal of ERW risks is a crucial part of the stabilization efforts in the national development process”⁸.

However, progress for SEMA has been constrained by numerous factors. Draft legislation and budget approval has been delayed resulting in differences of perception regarding SEMA’s legitimacy and intermittent budget allocations. This has resulted in staff turnover, reducing internal resources and knowledge. In response, capacity building efforts have been enacted by international actors. Currently, the SEMA Federal office has a staff of 15 people, with two persons in the SEMA state offices operating in each of the 5 states.

Several international UN agencies and humanitarian demining organisations are present in the country.

UNMAS

The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) has been in country since 2008 providing capacity building support at both Federal and State levels. In 2017, UNMAS handed over its information management system for mine action (IMSMA). Since this time UNMAS has been conducting and tendering mine clearance activities related humanitarian mine clearance including Survey, EORE, EOD and recently manual clearance of minefields. This work has focused on accessible areas along the border areas with Ethiopia; as well as security related

⁸ Somalia, National Development Plan, (2017-2019), page 21.

support contracts such as IED Threat Mitigation in support of mission troops and Somali Police Forces to build their capability to respond IEDs and other EO.

A summary of key activities of UNMAS support to SEMA is given below:

- UNMAS supported establishment of Somali national mine action authority in 2008/2013
- Establishment of Police EOD/IEDD capacity (equip, train and mentor) 2008-2010.
- Establishment of SNA IEDD capacity in 2020/21.
- Provided capacity building support to SEMA since 2013.
- Support WAM and IED at policy level.

The HALO Trust

Has been in Somalia since 2015 where it conducted significant survey along border areas with Ethiopia, (2015-2017) and since expanded to clearance of these areas.

MAG

Present in Somalia since 2009, originally working in Puntland and undertaking work in support of Ammunition management and EORE.

Danish Demining Group (DDG) / Danish Refugee Council

DDG present in Somalia 2007 undertaking EORE activities in Benadir Region, South West and Jubaland states.

Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)

Present in Somalia since 2015, providing capacity building support to SEMA, EORE and BAC

Ukroboronservice (UOS)

Present in Somalia since 2010 undertaking clearance together with EORE in 4 States.

National Demining Consortia

There are four national consortiums operating in the Federal Member States (FMS) of Somalia representing each federal member state. The consortiums have a capability to deliver risk education services in their respective areas of operations.

5. Methods used to identify areas containing AP mines and reasons for suspecting the presence of AP mines in other areas

The handover of coordination from UNMAS to SEMA in 2015 included the conferral of technical mine action standards and guidelines developed during UNMAS tenure. These standards, based on the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) direct the implementation of mine clearance, oversee the accreditation of mine action organisations and outline quality assurance for tasks completed.



Photo 3. People from a local community play sport on recently released land.

The Somalia National Mine Action standards direct the methods used to process known or suspected mined areas. Areas that are identified to contain or to suspect to contain anti-personnel landmines are processed according to the land release process, as contained in the Somalia national standards. Land Release in Somalia, involves, non-technical survey, technical survey and clearance through manual and/or other methodologies, including the use of mine detection dogs.

6. Nature and extent of progress made: Quantitative aspects

Somalia's effort to respond to anti-personnel mine contamination began before it joined the Convention in 2012. These early efforts include two Landmine impact surveys (LIS) conducted in three-phases in Puntland and Somaliland. At the time, the South-Central region of the country was not included in the survey.



Figure 4. Locations of Three Phased Landmine Impact Surveys, 2003-2008, together with targeted locations for future survey.

LIS Phase I – Somaliland (2002-2003)

Implemented in the following regions: Awdal, Hargeisa, Togdheer and Saaxil.

A total of 772 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) were identified in 356 communities, 45 communities were reported to be highly impacted, 102 medium impacted, and 210 were low impacted.




Figure 5. Location of Explosive Hazards, LIS Phase 1

LIS Phase II – Puntland (2005)

Implemented in the following regions: Bari, Nugaal and North of Mudug.

A total of 47 SHAs were identified in 35 communities, 9 communities were reported to be highly impacted, 9 medium impacted and 17 were low impacted .

LIS Disputed Areas (Sool and Sanaag Regions) (2006-2007)

Implemented in the following regions: Sool and Sanaag.

A total of 210 SHAs were identified in 90 communities, 11 communities were reported highly impacted, 24 medium impacted and 55 low impacted.




Figure 6. LIS Phase 2 and 3 locations Sool and Sanaag Regions

As a result of the two phase LIS, an estimated 1,039 suspected hazardous areas (SHA) for all types of explosive ordnance were identified located in 481 communities, covering 8 regions.

2008 Technical Survey

Follow up technical survey to identify the exact perimeters of the hazard areas have been constrained by insecurity and recurrent conflicts. In 2008, localised re-survey began to estimate the level of contamination in the South West regions, including Bakol, Bay, and Hirshabelle region of Hiran. These surveys resulted in 79 communities surveyed reporting to be contaminated by mines and/or ERW. Other contaminated areas were reported along the border with Ethiopia, in Galguduud and Gedo regions, as well as in Hiraan.

2012 Re-Survey

During 2012, a re-survey of hazard areas identified during the two-phase LIS was undertaken by HALO and DDG in Somaliland. The re-survey focused on technical survey and reduced the known level of contamination for all hazards types.




Figure 7. Re-survey of State based LIS Data –conducted in 2012

As a result, Somalia in its initial Article 7 transparency report of 2013 reported 333 mined areas known to contain anti-personnel mines as remaining from its previous LIS surveys .





Figure 8. Map showing explosive hazard contamination (all types) in Somalia for the period 2004-2012

2015-2016 Non-Technical Survey

During the period, 2015 to February 2016 the HALO Trust conducted non-technical survey on areas along the majority of the Somalia-Ethiopia border in the Provinces of Galgaduud, Bakool and Hiraa, in the states of Galmudug, Southwest and Hirshabelle, located in south central Somalia, the survey was not conducted in Somaliland and Puntland.

As a result of the survey 75 mined areas and one battlefield area were identified measuring 6,052,744 square metres, with a total 136,939 square metres of hazardous area being addressed



| NTS Survey Area by District | | | |
|-----------------------------|------------|-----------|-------------------------------|
| Province | District | Task Type | Survey Area (m ²) |
| Bakool | El Barde | Minefield | 885,363 |
| | | BAC | 762,143 |
| | Yeed | Minefield | 786,379 |
| Galgaduud | Abudwaq | Minefield | 1,013,228 |
| Hiraan | Beletweyne | Minefield | 2,605,631 |
| Total | | | 6,052,744 |

Table 3.Total Reported outputs for Non-technical survey, 2015-2016




Figure 9. Results of Non-Technical Survey conducted 2015-2016



Photo 4. Mine Action Representative conducting an interview during non-technical survey, (2015-2017)

In its Article 7 report of 2018, Somalia reported that the process of updating and verifying historical data was continuing. Somalia also reported it had implemented a new country reporting structure including 7 States: Banadir, Hirshabelle, Souh West, Jubaland, Galmudug, Puntland and Somaliland. Based on this update Somalia provided progress covering three states, Galmudug, Hirshabelle and South West with information from Banadir, Jubaland and Puntland reported to be in still undergoing processing.



Photo 5. PP-Mi-Sr AP mine (Photo: The Halo Trust)



Figure 10. Closed Hazard Areas for the period (2015-2020).

2018 Land Release

Land release activities continued in 2018, with 107 Confirmed Hazardous Areas and 5 Suspected Hazardous Areas located in Galmudug and Hirshabelle State registered in SEMA's database, with 18 of these areas containing anti-personnel mines.

Somalia reported a total remaining anti-personnel mine challenge of 18,577,705 square metres, including:

Galmudug State

7,066,584 square metres including 3,482,650 square metres of CHA.

Hirshabelle State

7,170,123 square metres, including 381,922 square metres of CHA

South west State

4,340,998 square metres, including 2,234,264 square metres of CHA

2019 Land Release

Land release efforts continued in 2019, with Somalia reporting a total area including all types of explosive ordnance measuring 15,661,737 square metres released. This included 207,500 square metres cancelled, 49,925 square metres reduced, and 15,404,312 square metres cleared. As a result, Somalia reported a total of 30 hazards, including 18 confirmed hazardous areas measuring 6,098,836 square metres and 11 suspected hazardous areas (SHA) including 1 measuring an estimated 10.4 square metres, and 10 of an unknown size remaining to be addressed. These figures resulted from database clean-up efforts to remove "closed" hazardous areas from the database. However, the true extent of contamination is expected to be far greater.

At this time, due to a lack of resources to deploy sufficient survey teams and a lack of access to areas due to ongoing security concerns a more detailed estimate of mine contamination is not able to be made in Somalia.



Photo 6. UNMAS Contracted Mine Action Team

7. Nature and extent of progress made: Qualitative aspects

Since acceding to the Convention in 2012, Mine Action in Somalia has faced two recurrent challenges that continue to impede progress, a) lack of resources, and b) continued insecurity.

Lack of resources

A lack of resources has been exacerbated by the prolongation of formal budget approval of SEMA by the Federal Parliament, constraining the allocation of State funds from the national budget. This has resulted in SEMA being dependent on external support to undertake coordination of the Somalia mine action programme. During this time, international actors, including UNMAS, the HALO Trust and NPA have provided elements of capacity building support to SEMA. This has proved essential to national coordination whilst SEMA awaits sustainable national budgetary support. Capacity building support has been directed to both Federal and State level SEMA offices, covering administrative, management and technical operations, (task order preparation, quality assurance, and database management). Further

capacity building efforts have focused on supporting consortia of local humanitarian mine action organisations.

Insecurity

Insecurity continues as a result of inter-clan conflict and the presence of non-state armed groups. Conflict between clans can place survey and clearance personnel direct risk of harm, restricts the mobility of goods and teams across different regions, constraining operational efficiency and increasing the logistical challenge in training and deploying teams.

8. Methods & standards used to release areas known or suspected to contain AP mines

The Somalia National Mine Action Standards (NMAS) are based on the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). Where necessary these standards have been enhanced to provide the most appropriate level of safety required for humanitarian mine action operations in the context of Somalia. The first edition of the Somalia standards was published 1 August 2018. These standards were reviewed during 2021 with full approval expected in 2021. The NMAS are split into four parts:

1. Part 1. Land Release
2. Part 2. Information System Management (IMSMA)
3. Part 3. Mine Risk Education (MRE)
4. Part 4. Quality Assurance of Mine Action Operations (QA)

These standards direct the work of all operators implementing humanitarian mine action in the country. These standards direct the work of all operators implementing humanitarian mine action in the country. NTS/TS is integrated to all mine clearance activities to reduce amount of land to be cleared through mine clearance procedure, and this methodology has positively contributed to the ongoing mine clearance activities in Somalia.

9. Efforts undertaken to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians from mined areas

The primary means to exclude civilians from mined areas is through explosive ordnance risk education (EORE). An EORE programme has long been established in Somalia. EORE takes place as part of land release activities in affected communities. A number of studies

have been done on the conduct of EORE in Somalia, taking into account both the cultural and security issues and the prevalence of improvised explosive devices (IED) in Somalia.



Photo 7. EORE taking place with internally displaced people.

Table: MRE (EORE) Beneficiaries disaggregated by sex and year

| Year | Boys | Girls | Men | Women | Total |
|------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|------------------|
| 2011 | 55,503 | 49,854 | 22,108 | 47,804 | 175,269 |
| 2012 | 88,593 | 80,400 | 21,775 | 38,598 | 229,366 |
| 2013 | 211,233 | 185,540 | 53,456 | 75,598 | 525,827 |
| 2014 | 71,752 | 56,270 | 34,733 | 32,487 | 195,242 |
| 2015 | 37,961 | 30,298 | 22,081 | 22,309 | 112,649 |
| 2016 | 7,301 | 5,926 | 3,910 | 4,644 | 21,781 |
| 2017 | 4,245 | 2,532 | 2,400 | 2,110 | 11,287 |
| 2018 | 12,359 | 8,597 | 5,527 | 4,181 | 30,664 |
| 2019 | 17,601 | 12,006 | 7,274 | 6,108 | 42,989 |
| 2020 | 21,493 | 15,768 | 11,635 | 13,422 | 62,318 |
| 2021 (Jan-March) | 7,237 | 5,659 | 2,742 | 2,985 | 18,623 |
| Total | 535,278 | 452,850 | 187,641 | 250,246 | 1,426,015 |

Table 4. MRE (EORE) beneficiaries disaggregated by sex and year

Table: MRE (EORE) beneficiaries disaggregated by sex and region

| Region | Boys | Girls | Men | Women | Total |
|---------|---------|---------|--------|---------|---------|
| Bakool | 15,483 | 11,456 | 12,166 | 11,369 | 50,474 |
| Banadir | 267,260 | 233,497 | 67,303 | 107,779 | 675,839 |

| | | | | | |
|--------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|------------------|
| Bay | 54,411 | 38,463 | 15,947 | 36,634 | 145,455 |
| Galgaduud | 25,770 | 19,892 | 17,822 | 17,774 | 81,258 |
| Gedo | 63,767 | 55,296 | 13,162 | 12,960 | 145,185 |
| Hiraan | 37,219 | 32,876 | 14,551 | 13,403 | 98,049 |
| Lower Jubba | 27,515 | 27,309 | 22,482 | 30,271 | 107,577 |
| Lower Shabelle | 29,258 | 23,678 | 16,848 | 14,264 | 84,048 |
| Middl Jubba | 2 | 12 | - | 33 | 47 |
| Middle Shabelle | 6,995 | 4,116 | 4,989 | 2,122 | 18,222 |
| Mudug | 6,843 | 5,672 | 2,016 | 3,388 | 17,919 |
| PL-Bari | 144 | 95 | 168 | 126 | 533 |
| PL-Mudug | 579 | 478 | 51 | 105 | 1,213 |
| PL-Nugaal | 32 | 10 | 136 | 18 | 196 |
| Grand Total | 535,278 | 452,850 | 187,641 | 250,246 | 1,426,015 |

Table 5. MRE (EORE) beneficiaries disaggregated by sex and region.

In 2018 a “Knowledge, Attitude, Practice and Behaviour (KAPB) Baseline Survey on Explosive Remnants of War and landmines Galmudug and Puntland States of Somalia”. The study employed a mix of qualitative and quantitative methods, and a suitable sample size. The KAPB study reported that 84% of those interviewed have heard about ERWs/landmines (i.e., are ‘aware’) but that 15% of those interviewed have “never heard of ERWs/landmines.

This survey informs the development of context-specific MRE/EORE to affected communities and other populations at-risk. This includes the development of approaches tailored to the threat encountered by the population, including specific risk behaviours and attitudes. For example, the survey reported that an estimated, “11% (of respondents who had seen a suspect ERW) mentioned they would not take any action, while others would engage in risky behaviour such as going to places that are likely to be contaminated with ERWs/landmines, for instance abandoned vehicles (53%), abandoned military fields (49%) and abandoned buildings (48%).⁹

This survey also informs the delivery of MRE/EORE directly to an analysis of available casualty and contamination data. The survey found that given, “the pastoral nature of the community, animals (52%) and livestock herders (47%) are also victims of such explosions.

⁹ Knowledge, Attitude, Practice and Behaviour (KAPB) Baseline Survey on Explosive Remnants of War and landmines Galmudug and Puntland States of Somalia, page 10.

Children (61%) unknowingly and innocently are likely to pick and play with ERW/landmine and in the process of they risk and pose danger to themselves and those around them”.¹⁰ As part of recent developments, MRE stakeholders have produced the Risk Education Talking Device’ (RETD). This device is a solar powered handheld audio device commissioned by UNMAS and 2,500 units have been handed out to the beneficiary households by HALO, UOS and JUMAN. The RETD device is pre-loaded with EORE audio messages and has recently be initiated as alternative EORE tool with the challenges of COVID.

It has also been assessed as important tool mainly for young children (majority of victims in Somalia) as audio record includes short entertaining music, poem, COVID prevention messages, among others. In relation to this, MAG is currently converting into Audio-Visual animation expected to be launched in 2 months' time.



Photo 8. MRE (EORE) being conducted with women in outdoor setting.

10. Resources made available to support progress made to date

The following resources have been provided to SEMA and the Mine Action Programme during the period of the original Article 5 deadline.

Trained staff

¹⁰(KAPB) Baseline Survey, page 36.

Office space (hard wall) and equipment

National Mine Action Database (IMSMA)

Approved national mine action strategy

Draft national mine action standards

National Victim Assistance Action plan

11. Circumstances that impede compliance in a 10-year period

Based on input from SEMA and stakeholders the following factors were identified as significant circumstances that impeded Somalia's progress in achieving its mine action obligations within its initial 10-year period.

1. Insufficient information about the extent of the contamination
2. Insufficient information about the impact of the contamination
3. Limited access to contaminated areas because of security concerns
4. Other types of contamination (such as IED) have had to take priority
5. Lack of training
6. Lack of resources
7. Lack of effective coordination and prioritization

The security situation in Somalia

The presence of non-state armed groups also poses an acute threat to implementation, In July 2018, the SEMA central office at the Ministry of Internal Security in Mogadishu was attacked and significantly damaged, some of its staff injured, and much of SEMA's office materials, including computers and documents, were destroyed. UNMAS provided support to SEMA in the reconstruction of a solid-walled office.

Inter-communal tensions in Somalia

As previously discussed, inter-communal tensions and localised conflict continues in Somalia. The impact of inter-clan conflict limits the deployment of mine clearance teams across differing regions. This has resulted in more in-depth liaison between mine clearance operators and local elders and has complicated while also increasing the recruitment of local clans for tasks within their regions, respectively. At the same time, the completion of tasks

and the need for mine clearance teams to redeployment to priority tasks in other regions can further exacerbate local tensions.

The implications of these two forms of conflict on humanitarian mine action make it difficult for implementing partners to travel to, work or supervise work in certain parts of the country. Furthermore, as the security situation is fluid, the impact of this limitation is not always predictable. Whilst the acute implications for personal security are clearly understood, the chronic situation means that it is difficult for implementing agencies to deploy personnel recruited in one clan area, to another clan area, respectively.

12. Humanitarian, economic, social and environmental implications

The National Development Plan of Somalia, (2017-2019) noted the impact of, “Explosives Remnants of War (ERW), including landmines and munitions...on...marginalized communities along the Ethiopian border and in pockets within the country where conflict has occurred. From a development perspective, ERW may affect major infrastructure projects such as roads as well as major investment opportunities. ERW continues to be a security concern for sustainable development initiatives and removal of ERW risks is a crucial part of the stabilization efforts in the national development processes”.¹¹

SEMA's 2018 National Mine Action Strategy stated that as, “much of the population is mobile (nomadic herders), with many refugees and IDPs currently gathered in urban centres but with the potential to return to their homes as the country stabilizes; and those homes may be in mine/ERW affected areas. In affected communities, mines/ERW threaten people and animals; and the evidence that people collect and carry ERW (retaining them for future sale or use, even using hazardous items as landmarks, decoration, or goal posts on a children's soccer field) points to the evident need for clearance and mine/ERW risk education”.

Due to a lack of information, the exact scale and complexity of anti-personnel landmine contamination and the impact in Somalia are not well known.

¹¹Somalia, National Development Plan (2017-2019), page 21.



Photo 9. Photo showing communities cutting trees for firewood in the minefield

In 2020 alone, a total of 49 ERW/mine related victims were recorded, with 76% of the deaths and injuries reported being among children. Research has shown that children are relatively at a higher risk of being victims of ERW accidents than adults. There is also evidence of practices that increase the risks to individuals and the surrounding communities, including harvesting of explosive material for economic necessity, domestic stockpiling, and the use of explosive material in commercial activities (e.g., quarry mining and digging wells). These risk-taking practices are aggravated by unemployment and the lack of awareness in the communities.



Photo 10. Mine showing harvesting of explosives

Based on input from implementing partners, SEMA identified the following needs for MRE

The Needs: The presence of explosive hazards continues to be prevalent across Somalia affecting the civilian population, despite the ongoing clearance and risk education efforts. Over the years, The Somali mine action program data has statistical evidence that children remain the most affected group by explosive ordnance accidents, accounting for up to 80% of the victims. Obviously, children exhibit higher levels of curiosity when they encounter unknown objects, often tampering with explosive objects while playing, herding animals, or whilst on transit to/from school. Likewise, IDPs and families with nomadic lifestyles are adversely affected in Somalia, while they traverse large territories unknown to them and likely to be contaminated. The response by mine action actors in many parts of the country has been daunting, as the progress towards addressing the explosive hazard threat appears to be a moving target. This is especially so, areas in such a situation should receive continuous risk education through various medium of communications.

13. Nature and extent of the remaining Article 5 challenge: quantitative aspects

Remaining Challenge

As of 31 December 2020, the known remaining challenge in Somalia for all explosive devices of 161, 806, 388 square metres.

Contamination data gathered through historical surveys are considered outdated with more recent conflict resulting in recontamination of some areas. Database clean-up efforts have been undertaken to remove “closed” hazardous areas from the database. At this time, due to a lack of resources to deploy sufficient survey teams and lack of access to areas due to ongoing security concerns a more detailed estimate of mine contamination is not able to be made in Somalia. The table below summarises Somalia’s known explosive ordnance contamination, including mixed minefields and battle areas, in which APM have been identified as of 31 December 2020.

| Federal Member State | District | CHA | CHA | CHA | CHA | CHA | CHA | CHA | SHA | SHA | Grand Total |
|----------------------|------------|---------|----------------------|-------------------|----------------|-------------|------------|-----------|--------|----------------|-------------|
| | | AP/AT | AP/AT/CM/ UXO/AXO | AP/AT/UXO/ AXO | AP/UXO/ AXO | AT | AT/UXO/AXO | UXO/AXO | AT | AT/UXO/ AXO | |
| Galmudug | Abudwaq | | | 593,796 | | 143,285,458 | 548,632 | 8,236 | 40,643 | | 144,476,765 |
| Galmudug | Balanbale | 884,387 | | 1,220,115 | | 59,364 | 454,147 | | | | 2,618,013 |
| Galmudug | Dusmareb | | 784,352 | | | | 329,113 | 2,087,013 | | | 3,200,478 |
| Hirshabelle | Beletweyne | | | 22,853 | | 667,829 | 4,498,677 | 195,874 | 52,270 | 15,053 | 5,452,556 |
| Hirshabelle | Mataban | | | | 240,835 | 463,784 | 837,590 | | | 57,124 | 1,599,333 |
| Hirshabelle | Maxaas | | | 118,234 | | | | | | | 118,234 |
| SouthWest | Ceel Barde | 112,904 | | 2,121,360 | | 269,610 | 1,050,745 | | | | 3,554,619 |
| SouthWest | Yeed | | | | | | 786,379 | | | | 786,379 |
| Grand Total | | 997,291 | 784,352 | 4,076,358 | 240,835 | 144,746,045 | 8,505,283 | 2,291,134 | 92,913 | 72,177 | 161,806,388 |




Figure 11. Somalia known Explosive Hazard Contamination (2021)

14. Nature and extent of the remaining Article 5 challenge: qualitative aspects

14.1. Mines of an improvised nature

Somalia recognises that ‘mines of an improvised nature’ pose a significant risk to the population.

The national mine action strategy highlights that, “The presence of large quantities of abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) at abandoned ammunition storage facilities...provides raw materials for the manufacture of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by Al-Shabaab. It is estimated that 91% of IEDs in Somalia are composed of explosives harvested from ERW.”¹²

The 2019 Oslo Action Plan¹³ makes specific reference to such weapons. Action #21 of the Oslo Action Plan states that:

“States Parties affected by anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature will ensure that they apply all provisions and obligations under the Convention to such contamination as they do for all other types of anti-personnel mines, including during survey and clearance in fulfilment of Article 5 and disaggregate by types of mines when reporting in fulfilment of Article 7 obligations”.

Many of the items of EO found in Somalia are classified as IED.

Whilst it is currently true that most IED are not primarily designed as victim operated improvised explosive devices (VOIED). It has been reported that EO can be used as a source of the explosive main charges being used in various IED in Somalia.

14.2. Dealing with other types of contamination

While this request covers Somalia’s obligations under the Anti-personnel landmine Convention, it can be noted that responding to anti-personnel mines forms only part of Somalia’s response to explosive ordnance contamination. In this regard, all explosive

¹²Somalia National Mine Action Plan, page 12.

¹³As adopted on 29 November 2019

ordnance contamination that poses a risk to the Somali population must be addressed, including AP mines. In this way, Somalia's effort to implement its obligations under Article 5 form part of the totality of its efforts to address explosive ordnance in the country. Somalia will continue to disaggregate the challenge of anti-personnel mine contamination from other EO to the extent possible, particularly as more evidenced based survey work is undertaken.

15. Amount of time requested and a rationale for this amount of time

Somalia is requesting a five-year extension of its deadline under Article of the Convention, from 1 October 2022 – 1 October 2027.

The rationale for the period request is based on several factors, including the current level of conflict and insecurity present in the country that constrains access to contaminated areas, and the current human, financial and technical resources available to implement Somalia's obligations under Article 5.

Somalia remains committed to fulfilling its obligations under the Convention, particularly in respect to Article 5. Somalia is committed to work towards the goals of the Oslo Action Plan, (2020-2024), including to complete the obligations as soon as possible and to the fullest extent possible by 2025. However, due to the need for further capacity building, preparation and planning of non-technical survey to be undertaken in a changing security environment. Somalia will need to request a period extending beyond the aspirational date of 2025 and will continue to keep the States Parties updated on its progress, in achieving its obligations and goals.

16. Detailed work plan for the period of the requested extension

SEMA will continue to work with stakeholders to continue lifesaving mine action activities. It must be noted that as the security situation in Somalia is volatile and constantly changing an adaptable working model to the prioritization and implementation of activities outlined in the work plan must be retained. In this way, the work plan aims to continue national capacity building efforts of SEMA to build greater coordination while also continuing work with stakeholders to ensure lifesaving mine action activities in accessible areas are implemented. The 2019 Oslo Action Plan (OAP) outlines best practices on the implementation of survey, clearance and mine risk education activities, together with indicators for measuring progress. In formulating the work plan Somalia has considered key elements of the OAP, including Actions #23 and #24.

Due to the changing nature of conflict, Somalia will work with implementing partners to update this detailed work plan on an annual basis, with a revised work plan to be shared once non-technical survey pilot has been completed for Phase two. The estimated date for completion is 1 October 2022, with an updated work plan planned for submission by 30 April 2023, as part of Somalia's Article 7 transparency reporting. A two-phase approach will be adopted to implement activities:

Phase One. Present - 1 October 2022)

Phase Two. (1 October 2022 – 1 October 2027)

The two phase work plan below includes the following two components; i) Building the national capacity of SEMA, and, ii) Continued implementation of land release and mine risk education activities in secure areas.

Integration of Gender and Diversity into the Work Plan

Somalia recognises the value of the United Nations Gender Guidelines for Mine Action Programmes¹⁴ in developing an inclusive gender policy for mine action. This policy will be developed as part of Phase One of Somalia's work plan, including reference to the following key principles:

All NTS, clearance and Mine Risk Education teams must be meaningfully gender-balanced

The voices of all demographic groups (men, women boys and girls) will be heard as valid and equal sources of information in the NTS, clearance and MRE

The rights of all demographic groups (men, women boys and girls) will be treated fairly and equally in decisions on the identification and prioritisation of clearance work

All implementing agencies will be encouraged to adopt gender-sensitive recruitment procedures in all mine action projects.

The Somalia Mine Action Programme considers Gender and Diversity aspects in delivering mine action services. Various strategic documents will inform gender and diversity initiatives in Somalia including Mine Action Standards, Gender and Mine Action Programme and UN in Somalia Gender Strategy. They demonstrate how their interventions take gender and diversity (i.e., age, clan, disability, among others) into account during all phases of the project planning cycle and apply it to their operations.

¹⁴3rd Edition (2019). See

https://www.mineaction.org/sites/default/files/publications/mine_action_gender_guidelines_web_0.pdf

Gender and diversity influence the way in which a person is affected by explosive contamination – including their risk of becoming a victim, the ability to access medical and support services, and their long-term recovery and reintegration. In addition to this, gender roles and responsibilities of women, girls, boys, and men, in mine action activities affect access to services and opportunities in communities. Women, girls, boys, and men provide valuable information about contaminated areas and uses of those areas. All Mine Action operators in Somalia shall mainstream gender & diversity to the extent possible within the context of the interventions.

As part of gender and diversity mainstreaming, all Mine Action operators in Somalia will consider the youth and disadvantaged groups, such as minority groups, gender, disability and ex-combatants, etc., and include them to relevant roles. They will also consider safe and gender friendly facilities such as accommodation, transport, equipment, etc. where this is deemed necessary for the safe and efficient implementation of their projects. The operators shall implement a gender and diversity sensitive Quality Management System (QMS) across the complete spectrum of their operations.

Monitoring and Evaluation system will include gender sensitive indicators applicable to Somali mine action program. The gender sensitive indicators will ensure collection and collation of comprehensive gender desegregated data. The operators shall conduct an awareness session for all staff on gender & diversity approach and conduct a “review session” within certain period on main challenges related to gender & diversity and for discussing lessons learned. Operators in Somalia shall provide their personnel an induction briefing and awareness upon deployment covering gender related safety and prevention of gender-based violence in the duty station and local gendered laws or customs. A channel to report concerns, make suggestions and raise gender and safety issues, also anonymously, is available to all personnel to strengthen accountability.

Phase One

Phase One covers the period from the present time to 1 October 2022. This phase includes:

- i) the continuation of activities building capacity of national demining institutions at both Federal and State levels and,
- ii) implementation of land release activities in accessible areas.

Component 1: Building the national capacity of SEMA

In order to ensure inclusive and participatory engagement in the Somalia Mine Action Programme, SEMA initiated a series of stakeholder meetings in 2020-2021, including a

series of technical operational meetings to discuss the development of activities in the work plan for Phase One. This engagement resulted in consensus on agreed activities under three key objectives for action with SEMA at both Federal and State levels. Technical meetings for EORE (MRE) were also planned but were postponed due to the current COVID-19 pandemic. It is envisaged that frequent and regular technical meetings, together with broader national level dialogues will be continued by SEMA. The three objectives are given below:

Further develop SEMA's administrative capacity

Further develop and sustain an effective information management system for Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA), Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), and Risk Education (RE)

Further develop an effective, independent, and organic Quality Assurance capacity within SEMA

Objective 1: Increased Administrative Capacity for SEMA

This objective seeks to further develop SEMA's policies, protocols, responsibilities, and obligations at both a Federal and a State level. These will be predicated upon the international standards expected of a National Mine Action Authority (NMAA), detailed within the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).

Objective 2: Further develop and sustain an effective information management system for Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA), Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), and Risk Education (RE)

This objective acknowledges that effective information management is essential for effective land release operations, including an evidence base to better inform prioritization, identifying information gaps, estimations on the time, money and effort needed to make Somalia mine free, and the impact of land release through post-clearance assessments.

Objective 3: SEMA QA Capability enhanced and formalised

This objective seeks to ensure the capability of SEMA to conduct Quality Assurance of mine action operators. Federal SEMA is recognised as holding the primary authority for QA, with State SEMA also recognised as the local authority for the conduct of QA. This objective will seek to build technical support and training to SEMA in order to deliver effective QA, and to monitor operators at both administration levels.

Training SEMA on how to implement QA, and then assisting in creating an effective QA plan is essential for building national capacity, legitimacy, and independence, and for ensuring operators meet international standards.

| OBJECTIVES | ACTIVITIES | ESTIMATED TIMEFRAME COMPLETION |
|---|--|--------------------------------|
| 1. Administrative Capacity | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Write a clear accreditation system agreed upon by SEMA stakeholders (including the relevant ministries and signed off by the respective governance body). - Share this system with Implementing Partners - Accounting, budgeting, and transparent organizational structure in line with FGS requirements | 1 October 2022 |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Write a clear tasking order request system agreed upon by SEMA stakeholders - Share this system with Implementing Partners - Enforce the following of this system | 1 October 2022 |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - All operators contribute to a national workplan - Workplan is transparent, and encompasses all annual tasks of all operators. | 1 October 2021 |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Review of current standards - Enhance national standards in accordance with IMAS - Roll out of adjusted national standards | 1 October 2021 |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Establish a reporting system (who, to whom, when, what) that is agreed upon by all the SEMA stakeholders - Share this system with Implementing partners | 1 October 2022 |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Needs based assessment and development of SEMA's budget, to be approved by the MoIS - Annual review of budget and finances | 1 October 2022 |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - National Mine Action Authority SOP written and supported by a committee of implementing partners, supported by UNMAS, to IMAS standards | 1 October 2022 |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Workshops and consensus building meetings facilitated between state and federal stakeholders - Policy paper published and agreed ratifying this relationship | 1 October 2022 |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Training in financial management systems and procurement management systems at both Federal and State level - Development of SEMA financial management system and procurement systems standards/processes - Have systems approved by all relevant stakeholders - Roll out of systems and regular follow up training/review | 1 October 2022 |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Train 10 SEMA personnel (from HQ and FMS) in operations, reporting, quality assurance (QA), risk education including field visits. - Field missions are assisted to conduct quality assurance monitoring, - Offices (HQ and FMS) are supplied to increase office functionality and coordination. - Assistant (local) is hired to oversee the capacity building of SEMA. | 1 October 2022 |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Three personnel are nominated for | 1 October 2022 | |

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|-------------------------------|--|----------------|
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> exchange program i.e., 2 SEMA officials and 1 representative from a local mine action NGO. - Relevant MA program is identified (preferably neighboring country) - All movements and visits are supported and facilitated | |
| 2. IM and Database Management | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Review of SEMA staff skills level -Identification of training needs -Implementation of training plan | 1 October 2023 |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Mentorship in IM by dedicated implementing partner capacity -Review of current system - Adjustment of system -Implementation of adjusted system | 1 October 2023 |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -QA performed on all existing data -Highlight areas gaps in knowledge, awareness, of capacity - Update of national data base - Presentation of existing contamination to international community/donor representation | 1 October 2027 |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Prioritizations developed from contamination data, in conjunction with local stakeholders and communities | 1 October 2027 |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Existing landmine/ERW victim data is consolidated -Victim Assistance information collected from relevant operators and disseminated through the cluster system | 1 October 2027 |
| 3. QA Capability | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Training on technical skills necessary for EORE, clearance and EOD activities -Training on how to perform Quality Management -Review, development and issuance of QA forms -Development of clear QA workplan, agreed with operators. -Establishment of clear procedures on QA responsibilities, obligations, and transparency | 1 October 2023 |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Establishment of a simple database standard and feedback mechanism, agreement of system by all stakeholders -Coordination and roll out of system with all international MA partners, to populate accordingly. - Regularly maintain and keep updated database with the necessary copies of certification. | 1 October 2023 |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - QA over EORE, clearance and EOD teams in all locations (either run by Federal or State level SEMA). - Gap analysis conducted on an annual basis - Request for task orders to support specific areas to IPs based on gap analysis. - Delivery of relevant trainings (EORE, NTS, EOD, clearance, etc.) | 1 October 2027 |

Component 2: Continued implementation of land release activities in secure areas.

Component 2 seeks to equip SEMA and the Somalia Mine Action Programme with the capacity building support and partnerships to ensure the continuation of land release

activities in secure areas. For a complete list of operational and accessible areas, please refer to information as contained in Section 16: Institutional, human resource and material capacity to implement the plan. Component two is comprised of the following two activities:

1) Development of non-technical survey plan for secure areas, 2) Continuation of land release and mine risk education activities in secure areas.

1) Development of non-technical survey plan for secure areas

SEMA is cooperating with UNDP and one implementing partner (to be confirmed), to launch a capacity building 12-month project 2021. The project will initiate a pilot non-technical survey in the fourth quarter of 2021. This pilot is aimed to build SEMA's capacity to undertake a nationwide non-technical survey in Phase Two, (with consideration given to security and access to mined areas). The support aims to build administrative capacity in SEMA to improve their administrative functioning, including supporting one existing staff position in SEMA to enable the implementation of the programme.

| OBJECTIVES | ACTIVITIES | ESTIMATED TIMEFRAME COMPLETION |
|---|--|--------------------------------|
| Development of non-technical survey plan for secure areas | Analysis of existing information, including an assessment of gaps to identify priority areas for deployment. | 1 October 2022 |
| | Capacity building of SEMA to ensure the implementation of standardized survey and data collection. | 1 October 2022 |

2) Continuation of land release and mine risk education activities in secure areas

SEMA will continue to work with implementing partners to ensure land release activities are implemented in secure areas throughout Phase One. SEMA will also work to ensure that Mine Risk Education is carried out in communities targeted for land release and other at-risk groups as identified by SEMA and humanitarian partners in coordination with land release operations.

All mine action organisations operating in Somalia will incorporate explosive ordnance risk education interventions into their respective operations. The operators will deliver face-to-face risk education messaging across all the accessible districts. The face-to-face presentation will be accompanied with awareness promotion leaflets that are retained by each participant. The operators will also consider the areas that are partially accessible to provide risk education messages by disseminating audio-messages that are pre-recorded in a device (RETD) that can be distributed to the targeted population. The

operators use radio broadcast to disseminate to reach out the communities within the hard-to-reach areas. Messages are tailored considering the audience with the intent in include all population groups including men, women, boys, and girls. The operators will also consider devising animated messages targeting persons with disabilities particularly those with auditory impairment. Efforts to develop a digital EORE is ongoing with special focus on social media platforms and developing the necessary standards to guide the digital EORE interventions.

| OBJECTIVES | ACTIVITIES | ESTIMATED TIMEFRAME COMPLETION |
|---|--|--------------------------------|
| Continuation of land release and mine risk education activities in secure areas | Deployment of implementing partners to undertake land release activities in secure areas | 1 October 2022 |
| | Deployment of implementing partners to undertake Mine Risk Education activities | 1 October 2022 |

Phase Two

The second phase of this work plan covers the period 1 October 2022 – 1 October 2027 of the extension period. In terms of capacity building this phase will bring greater focus to information management and quality assurance initiated in Phase One. With regard to the implementation of non-technical survey in currently accessible areas based on the timing and outcome of the NTS pilot undertaken in Phase One. It is expected that SEMA's capacity will be built to coordinate a nationwide non-technical survey, (with consideration given to security and access to mined areas). In order to identify to the extent possible, the precise perimeter of mined areas. This phase will also continue lifesaving land release and mine risk education activities.

During Phase One a detailed budget together with a resource mobilisation strategy will be produced for activities in Phase 2 of the work plan. SEMA plans to develop a national plan for resources mobilization in collaboration with mine action stakeholders in Somalia, the government and donor countries with a more detailed and costed operational work plan, including capacity building, non-technical survey, and mine risk education for Phase Two. Somalia intends to keep States Parties apprised of its progress, with the updated work plan submitted as part of Somalia's Article 7 transparency report, 30 April 2023.

Component 1: Building the national capacity of SEMA

| OBJECTIVES | ACTIVITIES | ESTIMATED TIMEFRAME COMPLETION |
|-----------------------------------|--|--------------------------------|
| IM and Database Management | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Review of SEMA staff skills level - Identification of training needs -Implementation of training plan | 1 October 2023 |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Mentorship in IM by dedicated implementing partner capacity - Review of current system - Adjustment of system -Implementation of adjusted system | 1 October 2023 |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -QA performed on all existing data -Highlight areas gaps in knowledge, awareness, of capacity - Update of national data base - Presentation of existing contamination to international community/donor representation | 1 October 2027 |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Prioritizations developed from contamination data, in conjunction with local stakeholders and communities | 1 October 2027 |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Existing landmine/ERW victim data is consolidated -Victim Assistance information collected from relevant operators and disseminated through the cluster system | 1 October 2027 |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Training on technical skills necessary for EORE, clearance and EOD activities -Training on how to perform Quality Management -Review, development and issuance of QA forms - Development of clear QA workplan, agreed with operators. - Establishment of clear procedures on QA | 1 October 2023 |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Establishment of a simple database standard and feedback mechanism, agreement of system by all stakeholders - Coordination and roll out of system with all international MA partners, to populate accordingly. - Regularly maintain and keep updated database | 1 October 2023 |

| | | |
|--|---|----------------|
| | with the necessary copies of certification. | |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -QA over EORE, clearance and EOD teams in all locations (either run by Federal or State level SEMA). -Gap analysis conducted on an annual basis -Request for task orders to support specific areas to IPs based on gap analysis. -Delivery of relevant trainings (EORE, NTS, EOD, clearance, etc.) | 1 October 2027 |

Component 2:

1) Development of non-technical survey plan for secure areas

| OBJECTIVES | ACTIVITIES | ESTIMATED TIMEFRAME COMPLETION |
|---|--|--------------------------------|
| Development of non-technical survey plan for secure areas | Implementation of non-technical survey in secure areas | 1 October 2027 |

2) Continuation of land release activities in secure areas

| OBJECTIVES | ACTIVITIES | ESTIMATED TIMEFRAME COMPLETION |
|--|---|--------------------------------|
| Continuation of land release and | Deployment of implementing partners undertake land release activities in secure areas | 1 October 2027 |
| Mine Risk Education activities in secure areas | Deployment of implementing partners to undertake Mine Risk Education activities | 1 October 2027 |

17. Institutional, human resource and material capacity to implement the plan

Somalia currently has 7 international agencies supporting the implementation of its mine action Programme, (DDG, The HALO Trust, MAG, NPA, UNMAS, UOS, and UNDP) as well as national consortia. While the current COVID-19 pandemic has impacted the efforts of all operators, the capacity of the Somalia Government and implementing partners to adapt and adopt changes to external shocks, reveals the overall cooperation present in the

programme. The following international organisations and local consortia are currently present in Somalia.

Danish Demining Group (DDG): Has been in Somalia since 2007, operating across Somaliland, Puntland and South-central undertaking survey, EOD and EORE activities. DDG has recently merged to DRC and continues providing EORE activities in Banadir and Baidoa areas. DDG has started its HMA activities in northern regions (Somaliland) in 1991 after the conflict ended.

The HALO Trust: Has been in Somalia since 2015 where it conducted significant survey along border areas with Ethiopia, (2015-2017). HALO will deploy two manual clearance teams and two EORE teams under current contract with UNMAS. HALO is running multi-donor projects undertaking Survey, land release, EORE and PSSM activities in various regions of the country including in Somaliland, Puntland and Southcentral. HALO Trust has been active in Somaliland in since 1999 providing mine clearance and EORE in northern Somalia regions, making significant progress towards fully eliminating the landmine threats.

Mine Advisory Group (MAG): Has been in Somalia since 2009, initially working in Puntland and undertaking work in support of Ammunition management and EORE. MAG will continue operating in Somalia mainly EORE activities MAG has its currently piloting an animated EORE messages which will be relevant audio-visual aid in the country.

Norwegian People's Aid (NPA): Present in Somalia since 2015, providing capacity building support to SEMA HQ and state offices, EORE and clearance operations. NPA continues operations in Puntland state of Somalia conducting survey, database management and capacity building to SEMA Puntland personnel on EORE and survey.

Ukroboronservice (UOS): has been in Somalia as a commercial company and will be operational under UNMAS contracts until July 2024 undertaking clearance in the above districts along the border areas and EORE across the regions.

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP): Is cooperating with SEMA to initiate a 12 month capacity building project in July 2021 to support SEMA and an implementing partner to initiate a pilot non-technical survey in the fourth quarter of 2021.

United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS): will continue providing capacity building support. Besides, UNMAS has contracted mine action operators, UOS, for the coming three years (Jul 2021 – Jun 2024). UOS will deploy 8 manual clearance sections across the areas – Dollo, Elbarde, Beletweyne and Dhabad areas. Besides, UOS will also deploy 10 EORE

teams and 8 community liaison officers across 10 regions of Somalia. Similarly, UNMAS will continue the contract with HALO to deploy two manual mine clearance teams and two EORE teams to work in Dhabad and Galdogob areas until December 2021. UNMAS main focus in Somalia is supporting AMISOM and security forces in IED Threat Mitigation efforts.

| <u>S/N</u> | <u>Organization</u> | <u>MA Capacity</u> | <u>Regions</u> |
|------------|------------------------------|---|---|
| 1. | UNMAS Contractor (UOS) | 8x MMC Sections of 4 Teams | Hiran, Bakol, Galgadud and Gedo |
| 2. | | 2x QRT/EOD Teams (Mobile) | Gedo, Bakol, Hiran, Galgadud, Bay, Lower-shabelle, Middle-shabelle, Mudug, Lower-juba, and Banadir. |
| 3. | | 10x EROE Teams | Gedo, Bakol, Hiran, Galgadud, Bay, Lower-shabelle, Middle-shabelle, Mudug, Lower-juba, and Banadir |
| 4. | | 8x Community Liaison Officers | Gedo, Bakol, Hiran, Galgadud, Bay, Lower-shabelle, Middle-shabelle, and Lower-juba, |
| 5. | UNMAS EU funded (HALO Trust) | 2x EORE Teams | Galgadud and Mudug |
| 6. | | 2x MMC | Galgadud and Mudug |
| 7. | HALO Trust | 20x MMC/NTS | Galgadud, Mudug, Hiran, & Bakol |
| 8. | | 8x EORE/COT | Galgadud, Mudug, Hiran, & Bakol |
| 9. | | 3x WAM | Galgadud, Mudug, Hiran, & Bakol |
| 10. | Norwegian People's Aid | 4 x MMC | Galgadud and Mudug |
| 11. | | 2x MDD | Mudug |
| 12. | | 1x EORE | Nugal |
| 13. | DRC/DDG | 5x EORE | Bay, Lowerjuba, Gedo and Banadir |
| 14. | MAG | Focusing on development of digital EORE and polices | |

Table 6. States and locations of Implementing Partners, Somalia

17.1. Estimated Budget for Work Plan Activities

At the moment, SEMA is reliant on foreign financial resources. This is largely due to the current economic situation in Somalia. However, a budget proposal for SEMA has been submitted to the Ministry of Internal Security (MOIS). It is hoped that formal approval of SEMA together with allocations from the State budget will improve to facilitate future

contributions of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), as well as leverage international support to SEMA. In the meantime, SEMA is currently working with stakeholders on a national capacity building plan, together with a more detailed and costed operational work plan, including desktop survey and non-technical survey.

Shortage of resources is one of the main external factors which impede progress in Somalia. At the moment SEMA fully relies on very tiny foreign financial resources mainly due to the current economic situation in the country. The national MA programme is significantly under-resourced. Despite the situation, SEMA kept proposing a budget and submitting to the Ministry of Internal Security (MOIS) expecting approval of allocations from the State budget. There is a hope of government approval as of 2022. Thus, Somalia needs a robust resource mobilization strategy to reverse the challenges and help accomplish the planned milestones stipulated in the extension request – capacity building, gender action plan, resource mobilization, risk education, non-technical survey, and continuation of the existing clearance.

The capacity building support that will be provided by the international partners shall enhance the administrative and resource mobilization capacity of SEMA and be able to mobilize own funding from government or other sources. Thus, SEMA will be able to self-sufficiently coordinate the mine action programme.

The operators in Somalia will mobilize resources required for their respective tasks such as UNDP for the desk review and non-technical survey tasks; UNMAS, UOS, HALO, NPA, DDG, MAG for the risk education, clearance and capacity building activities from bilateral donors.

During Phase One a detailed budget will be produced for Phase Two of the work plan together with a resource mobilisation strategy for the activities provided in Phase 2. SEMA plans to develop a national plan for resources mobilization in collaboration with mine action stakeholders in Somalia, the government and donor countries with a more detailed and costed operational work plan, including desktop survey and non-technical survey provided for Phase Two of the work plan. Somalia intends to keep States Parties apprised of its progress, with the updated work plan submitted as part of Somalia's Article 7 transparency report, 30 April 2023. At the present time until 1 October 2022, the estimated annual cost for implementing the current work plan is estimated to be US \$6,400,000 per year. This includes:

1. SEMA operations at Federal and State levels (5 Offices): US \$900,000 per year

- | | |
|---|--------------------------|
| 2. UN agency support to Article Five compliance: | US \$500,000 per year |
| 3. Implementation of projected land release ¹⁵ | US \$5,000,000 per year. |

17.2. Risks / Assumptions

The following risks/ assumptions are made regarding the realisation of the plan.

1. **Security.** Somalia is beset by a number of security challenges. This work plan assumes there will be improvement in the current security situation in order to carry out non-technical survey in accessible areas. Somalia will continue to keep the States Parties apprised of its progress in implementing its work plan under Article 5 on an annual basis through its Article 7 reports and at Meetings of the States Parties.

2. **Coordination and Productivity.** The Somalia Mine Action Programme is currently implemented through contracting by UNMAS, bilateral funding to NGOS and relevant State SEMA offices. Based on the scope of this approach detailed tasking and prioritisation from SEMA Federal to States and implementing partners is not clear, with gaps reported in the information exchange between parties. Through the implementation of a strong capacity building component it is envisaged that SEMA will develop the coordination and quality management capacity to task and monitor land release activities during the period of the extension. Through greater coordination Somalia will support innovation in mine action that can improve efficiency and effectiveness of land release methodologies in accordance with OAP Action #27.

3. **Funding.** Current capacity building and land release is funded by external donors through SEMA's implementing partners at present. Significant reduction in funding will have an overall impact on coordination and productivity.

Current accessibility of Affected Areas (1 September 2021)

Vast locations of Somalia remain vulnerable to the persisting threat from anti-government elements, and the sporadic inter-clan conflict in some parts of the country. This limits the ease and safe access of mine action teams to the areas in need of clearance responses.

¹⁵ Please note: All mine action organisations operating in Somalia will incorporate explosive ordnance risk education interventions into the respective projects.

Despite these challenges, there are several districts with evidence of contamination that are accessible for humanitarian mine action operators in Somalia.

Accessible areas: areas with evidence of contaminations are mainly located along the border with Ethiopia including Dollo, Luuq, Yeed, Elbarde, Wajid, Huddur, Beletweyne, Mataban, Dhusamareb, Guriceel, Abuduwaq, Balamble, Adado, Dhabad, Galkayo, Galdogob, Burtinle, Eyl. Sool and Sanaag up to regions in northern Somalia (Somaliland) Some of the above areas are accessible only to certain buffer zone from the major towns. Districts in Somaliland, Puntland and majority of Galmudug are mainly accessible for Mine Action operations while areas in the southern and central part of Somalia (Hirshabelle, Southwest, Banadir and Jubaland) remain accessible in major towns with buffer zone and districts along the Somali, Ethiopian border where majority of the mine fields in the country are located.

Inaccessible areas: There are districts completely controlled by the armed groups where access is restricted and little, or no evidence of contamination could be obtained. These include Buale district, Sakow district, Jilib district, Rabdhure district, Tieglo district, Sablale district, Adan yabal, Halgen, El bur, El dher. Despite most are located away from the border areas, it is hard to confirm the absence of contaminations.

Annex:

A: Presidential Decree on the Establishment of the Somalia Explosive Management Authority (SEMA) (No.107, dated 6 Aug 2013)

Jamhuuriyadda Federaalka Soomaaliya
Xafiiska Madaxweynaha



جمهورية الصومال الفيدرالية
مكتب الرئيس

Federal Republic of Somalia
Office of the President

PRESEDENTIAL DECREE NO. 107
ESTABLISHMENT OF SOMALI EXPLOSIVES MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY

Date: August 6, 2013

PRESIDENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF SOMALIA,

Having seen: Article 87 (2) of the Provisional Constitution of the F.R.S.
Having seen: The Cluster Munitions Convention which Somalia is Part.
Having seen: The Presidential Decree N. 276 of 29th November 2011 .
Having seen: Law N. 34 of 14th April 1972 on Magistrate Account .
Having seen: The Proposal of the Minister of Internal Affairs and National Security.
Having seen: The Law N. 16 of 1st April 1970, regulating the Autonomous Agencies and the Law 36 of 22 April 1972 regulating the Employees of the Autonomous Agencies.
Bearing in mind: The need to establish the Somali Explosives Management Authority.

DECREES THE FOLLOWING:

Article 1

General Provisions

1. The Somali Explosive Management Authority is hereby established and is hereinafter referred to as ' Authority '.
2. It shall be an Autonomous Agency with judicial entity and shall be governed by the provisions of this Law.

Art. 2

Supervision of the Authority

1. The Authority shall be under the supervision of the Ministry of internal Affairs and National Security;
2. The Ministry may give the Authority such directives as he may consider from time to time in order ensuring that it acts in accordance with the best interest of the State.

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Art. 3**Head Office and Branches**

The Authority shall have its Head Office in Mogadishu and open branches, representative offices and Agents in other places within the Federal Republic of Somalia.

Art. 4**Objectives and Responsibilities**

1. The Authority shall have the authority to assume such powers considered for attainment of its objectives. Its primary objectives shall include acting as the Federal Government oversight of Explosive Management such as HMA, related activities conducted by the security sector and the safe and secure storage of ammunition, explosives and weapons.
2. However the appropriation, transfer, or use of ammunition and weapons is specifically excluded from mandate of the Authority, This shall be the responsibility of other relevant Government institutions and Armed Forces.
3. The Authority shall have the following responsibilities:
 - a) Follow up on the implementation of the obligations of the Government of Somalia under the Cluster Munitions and Ottawa Conventions and other relevant treaties on disarmament signed/ratified by Somali Government;
 - b) Responsible for all components of Mine action policy, mines survey, mines clearance, mine risk education, victim assistance and stockpile destruction.
 - c) Supervision of the plans of the National Mine Action Centres to implement the Strategy and policies formulated by the Committee or equivalent body.
 - d) Approval of plans presented by the Authority in Connection with planning and management and implementation of the mine clearance operations safely, effectively and efficiently.
 - e) Approval/endorsement of mine action strategies and plans at the national level.
 - f) Coordinates, supervises and implements mine action activities in collaboration with relevant such as UN agencies, International NGOs, National NGOs as the National Counterpart.
 - g) Ensures effective coordination of HMA activities in the country and implements policies and strategies approved by the Authority.
 - h) Develops and follow up implementation of the mine action standards in accordance with international Mine Action Standard (IMAS) with aim to regulate mine action activities in the country.
 - i) Establishes the Information management Systems for Mine Action (IMSMA) with the support of Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD).
 - j) Identifies responsibilities and activities in accordance with HMA priorities contained in the national HMA plans.
 - k) Review any necessary documents related to HMA or any other documents regarding mine action strategies and plans.

- l) The Authority shall prepare and submit reports of its activities to the Ministry of Internal Affairs and National Security on regular bases.
- m) Approval of the budget of the Authority in preparation for the approval of the Ministry of Finance.
- n) Preparation of the policies on the utilization of the financial sources allocated for the Authority.
- o) The Authority shall have financial resources allocated by the Government or contributions provided by donor countries and other donations.

Art. 5

The Power of the Agency

The Authority shall have the authority to assume such powers considered for the attainment of the stated objectives and responsibilities.

Art. 6

Loans

The Authority may, for purposes of its activities, obtain loans from financial institutions within the Federal Republic of Somalia and abroad with the approval of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and National Security.

Art. 7

Financial Year

The Financial Year of the Authority shall be from 1st January to 31st December each year.

Art. 8

Submitting the Annual Budget Statement

The Authority, not later than 31st December each year, prepares a statement to be called the Annual Budget Statement for the next financial year showing the estimated receipts and expenditure of the Agency. The Agency's Annual Budget Statement shall be submitted to the Ministry of Finance.

Art. 9

Auditing the Accounts

The accounts of the Authority shall be audited by a separate unit established in the Office of the Magistrate of Accounts for the purpose of auditing Autonomous Agencies.


Art. 10


The Presidential Decree N. 276 of 4th December 2011 is repealed

Art. 11

Taking Effect of the Decree

This Decree shall take effect on the day it is signed by the President of the Republic and shall be immediately published in the Official Bulletin of the Somali Republic.


The Minister of Interior and National Security
Abdikarim Hussein Guuleed


President of Somalia
H.E. Hassan Sheikh Mohamud